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Executive summary 
At the heart of what Vernon Bogdanor has described as the ‘The New 
British Constitution’ has been the rise in the political significance 
of the judiciary. The explosion in judicial review of government 
decisions, the incorporation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights into domestic law and the move to a new Supreme Court 
have all contributed to an extended process of increasing judicial 
power vis-a-vis the other limbs of state.
This emergence of a more powerful judicial branch of government 
has been essential in providing a restraint on executive power and in 
the admirable protection of individual and minority rights. However, 
it also raises significant issues. At the core of Britain’s unwritten 
constitution lies the concept of legitimacy as an underpinning for 
the rule of law. It is a basic premise in a mature democracy that 
those wielding power in the political sphere must – if this power 
is to be fully legitimate – also be in some way accountable to and 
representative of those from whom that power is derived and on 
whose behalf it is held.
This raises a pressing question in relation to the necessarily 
unelected judicial branch of government: ‘who guards the 
guardians?’ Or perhaps more accurately, how can one ‘guard the 
guardians’ without undermining the central principle of judicial 
independence? It also raises the important interconnected question 
of how the composition of the judiciary – in terms of its relationship 
to the diverse make-up of the society it serves – impacts on this 
concept of legitimacy.
These are in no way purely legal or technical issues but ones 
concerning the fundamental distribution and exercise of power in 
our democracy in which we all have a stake. The crux to resolving 
them lies in establishing a constitutionally appropriate system by 
which judges – and particularly the senior judges – are appointed. 
:
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This paper will argue that the current system for senior judicial 
appointments is not fit for purpose. It will argue that an appropriate 
process requires a rebalancing between three guiding constitutional 
principles for judicial appointments: independence, accountability 
and diversity. Establishing such a process will enhance not only 
the democratic legitimacy of the system as a whole but also 
– importantly – the authority of the judges themselves and the 
crucial role they perform.
Specifically:
The paper examines the factors contributing to the 
expanded constitutional role of the judiciary. It argues 
that, while of real societal value, the process has led to an 
increasingly porous boundary between legal and political 
decision-making and this should not be ignored. Instead, 
the enhanced judicial role should be placed on a more 
solid footing, buttressed by a constitutionally appropriate 
system of senior judicial appointments.
The paper then examines the current appointments 
process. It argues that the dominant extent to which the 
senior judiciary are involved in the appointment of the 
senior judiciary is inappropriate. It is of no disrespect to the 
eminent and high calibre individuals involved to recognise 
that, in a democracy, no branch of government should 
be potentially self-perpetuating. Democratic legitimacy 
requires a degree of involvement of elected officials in the 
appointment of those adjudicating on the laws passed by 
elected officials. 
The significant diversity deficit in the senior judiciary is 
then examined. The paper argues that diversity in senior 
judicial appointments is not simply a desirable goal, but a 
fundamental constitutional principle. At the very heart of 
the legitimacy of an independent judiciary are its claims 
to be able to deliver ‘fairness’. A senior judiciary whose 
composition reflects an apparent lack of fairness runs the 
real risk of undermining its own authority. 
Diversity also impacts directly on the substantive delivery 
of justice. Judicial decisions are unavoidably influenced by 
judicial background and perspective, particularly in relation 
to the arguable points of law before the highest courts. The 
law of the land constitutes the collective moral code of 
society. A key aspect of the competence of the Supreme 
Court, as a collective decision-making body, is that it should 
:
:
:
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be imbued with (and be able to relate to) the broad array 
of perspectives and experiences that contribute to that 
society. The institutional competence or ‘merit’ of such a 
court is significantly weakened if this is not the case.
The paper looks to draw lessons on senior judicial 
appointments from an international perspective by 
identifying mechanisms that have been introduced in 
other jurisdictions to enhance judicial accountability (while 
preserving judicial independence) and improve judicial 
diversity. In particular, it argues that the debate must move 
on from the reductive tendency to look only as far as the 
Senate confirmation hearing in the USA.
The paper outlines proposals to address the democratic 
deficit in senior judicial appointments. It recommends a 
move away from the present system of ad hoc appointing 
commissions with a predominating judicial influence 
towards a more enduring, expanded senior judicial 
appointments commission, with a balanced input from 
the senior judiciary, cross-party parliamentarians and lay 
members. This would be designed to enhance legitimacy 
without allowing any group a disproportionate sway. It will 
also argue that an appropriately designed system of post-
appointment parliamentary hearings should be introduced 
for newly appointed Supreme Court Justices (drawing on 
the process used in Canada). The purpose of these hearings 
would not be to alter or impact on the nomination but to 
facilitate a dialogue between parliament and the senior 
judiciary and allow the British public the opportunity to 
learn about those holding real power in their society.
The paper then outlines proposals to address the diversity 
deficit in senior judicial appointments. In particular, it calls 
for a reconsideration of the approach to the concept of 
‘merit’ in relation to appointments to the highest courts. 
It argues that the prevailing emphasis on (and exaltation 
of) one relentlessly individualised understanding of merit 
is inappropriate for appointments to the Supreme Court (as 
it would be for any collective court or body). Instead, the 
collective competence of the Court should play a central 
role in appointments to it, allowing for the correction of 
any corporate deficiencies such as the absence of particular 
legal specialisms or an imbalance in the membership of 
the court in terms of diversity of experience. With this, a 
candidate will – importantly – only be appointed if they are 
:
:
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the best candidate. They will be the best candidate because 
they best reflect what would be most beneficial to the Court 
and, as a result, the society it serves.
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Introduction 
“Who our judges are, and how they are selected, is a 
public matter and fully justifies public interest and 
debate.”1
Tom Legg
former Permanent Secretary of the  
Lord Chancellor’s Department 
“In a democracy with an uncodified constitution, there 
is much that depends not on law, but on a broader 
concept of legitimacy.”2 
    Jonathan Sumption 
Supreme Court Justice
 
Guarding the guardians?
With the 2009 move across Parliament Square to the newly created 
Supreme Court and the resulting structural separation of the senior 
judiciary from the legislature, the judiciary decisively assumed its 
position as the third branch of government in the United Kingdom. 
This move marked a further step in an extended constitutional 
process of increasing judicial power vis-a-vis the other limbs of 
state, described by one commentator as “a shift from democracy 
to ‘juristocracy’”.3 As the new Supreme Court Justice Jonathan 
Sumption indicates:
“One of the most significant constitutional changes to 
occur in Britain since the Second World War has been 
1 T Legg, ‘Judges for the New Century’, Public Law, Spring 3, 2001
2 J Sumption Q.C, ‘Judicial and political decision-making the Uncertain Boundary’, F.A. Mann 
Lecture, 2011
3 H Genn, ‘The Hamlyn Lectures 2008: Judging Civil Justice’, Cambridge University Press 2010
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the rise in the political significance of the judiciary”4.
This emergence of an empowered judiciary has been vital in 
providing a necessary restraint on executive power and in protecting 
individual and minority rights. However, perhaps inevitably, it has 
increasingly moved the judiciary – particularly the senior judiciary 
on which this paper will focus – more squarely into the political 
(‘with a small p’) arena.5 As one leading writer in the field outlines:
“The emergence of the judiciary as the third branch of 
government, checking and scrutinising the executive, 
has removed the gap between the functions of the 
senior judiciary and elected politicians. Judges are not 
politicians in wigs but they are increasingly required to 
reach decisions in relation to politically controversial 
issues which cannot be resolved without reference to 
policy questions.” [emphasis added]
With this comes a conundrum. The new constitutional settlement 
requires an independent and robust judiciary to provide an 
appropriate restraint on government power. However, it is a basic 
premise in a mature democracy that those wielding power in the 
public sphere must – if this exercise of power is to be fully legitimate 
- also be in some sense accountable to those from whom that power 
is derived and on whose behalf it is held. 
As Sumption identifies above, this concept of legitimacy lies at the 
core of Britain’s unwritten constitution and this is nowhere more 
acutely relevant than in relation to the necessarily unelected judicial 
branch. It gives rise, therefore, to a pressing question: ‘who guards 
the guardians?’ Or perhaps more accurately, how can one ‘guard 
the guardians’ without undermining the central principle of judicial 
independence? It also raises the important interconnected question 
of how the composition of the judiciary – in terms of its relationship 
to the diverse make-up of the society it serves – impacts on this 
concept of legitimacy (particularly in the context of the expanded 
judicial role).
These are in no way technical or theoretical issues relevant only 
4 J Sumption Q.C, ‘Judicial and political decision-making the Uncertain Boundary’, F.A. Mann 
Lecture, 2011
 The principal OED definition of ‘political’ is “of or concerning the state or its government”.
6 K Malleson, ‘Rethinking the Merit Principle in Judicial Selection’, Journal of Law and Society, 
Vol. 33, No. 1 March 2006
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to the practitioners involved but ones concerning the fundamental 
distribution and exercise of power in our democracy in which we 
all have a stake. The crux to resolving them lies in establishing 
a constitutionally appropriate system by which judges – and 
particularly the senior judges – are appointed. It is for this reason 
that, as High Court judge and former Solicitor General Sir Ross 
Cranston emphasises, “judicial appointments are too important to 
be left to the judges”.
Constitutional ‘touchstones’ for judicial 
appointments 
The argument that follows is predicated on the idea that there 
are three key constitutional principles or ‘touchstones’ that are 
relevant to and must in some way be balanced in relation to an 
appropriate system of senior judicial appointments: independence, 
accountability and diversity.
Independence
As the recent Ministry of Justice consultation paper recognises, 
“the rule of law is the basic foundation of our democracy”.8 At the 
heart of this concept is an independent judiciary able to ensure that 
the law is enforced equitably and equally against all - including the 
politicians who enact that law – and therefore protect basic rights 
and freedoms. This requires the judiciary to be free (and to be seen 
to be free) from undue political influence in its decision making and 
also in the means by which it is appointed. It is for this reason that 
judicial posts are rightly protected in terms of security of tenure, 
putting the position and conduct of individual judges essentially out 
of reach of the other branches of government. It is also this concept 
that lay heavily behind the push for a purer separation of powers 
and the removal of executive control of judicial appointments under 
the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (“CRA 2005”). Indeed, for some, 
it leads to the conclusion that the system of judicial appointments 
“should be wholly independent of external influence”.9 
 Sir Ross Cranston, ‘Foreword’, in, Alexander Horne, ‘The Changing Constitution: A Case for 
Judicial Confirmation Hearings?’, Study of Parliament Group, London 2010
 MOJ consultation paper, ‘Appointments and Diversity: A Judiciary for the 21st Century’, 2011
9 Lord Kerr, evidence before the Constitution Committee of the House of Lords, Autumn 2011. 
All quotations from evidence before the Constitution Committee are taken from the respective 
uncorrected oral transcript.
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Accountability
However, while vital, judicial independence cannot be an absolute 
in a democratic society. The defining concept of the rule of law 
itself is predicated directly on the consent and compliance of the 
governed and this in turn rests heavily on the legitimacy (and 
perceived legitimacy) of the institutions upholding the law. To turn 
this around, it is the legitimacy of the judiciary that justifies and 
supports their authority (and with it, their independence). Thus, as 
Lord Justice Etherton suggests:
“Of course the separation of powers is an important 
underlying factor in the appointment and operation of 
the judges, but that principle cannot be an absolute one 
in relation to the appointment of judges because the 
judges cannot be purely a self-appointing body.”10 
In a democracy, the legitimate exercise of power requires 
corresponding mechanisms of accountability:
“a mature democracy requires those who exercise 
significant public power to hold themselves open to 
account. Judicial power ought not to be excluded from 
accountability requirements. The challenge is to develop 
mechanisms of accountability that do not undermine 
judicial independence.”11 [emphasis added]
The need for sitting judges to be free from undue influence requires 
that any such mechanisms must operate at the appointments stage. 
As such, any desire to ensure that judicial appointments are ‘wholly 
independent of external influence’ is flawed: there is an important 
constitutional need to link in some way the (increased) power of the 
judiciary to those on whose behalf it is held. As Professor Thomas 
indicates, along with judicial independence:
“We also need to consider legitimacy. We are not just 
talking about constitutional principles—we are really 
talking about democratic principles. In a constitutional 
democracy, the legitimacy of unelected individuals—
judges—to adjudicate on the laws passed by elected 
officials requires that elected officials are in some way 
involved, particularly in the appointments process.”12
10 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
11 A Le Sueur, ‘Developing mechanisms for judicial accountability in the UK’, Legal Studies, 
Volume 24, Issue 1-2, 2004
12 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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Diversity
The democratic legitimacy of a branch of government is also 
directly linked to the extent to which it represents the society it 
serves. The increasing recognition of this fact has led to initiatives 
such as all-female shortlists for party candidates to become an MP. 
However, the concept of institutional legitimacy through reflective 
representativeness is particularly relevant to the judicial branch 
precisely because it is clearly precluded from the direct form of 
elected representativeness. 
At the very heart of the legitimacy of an independent judiciary are 
its claims to be able to deliver ‘fairness’. A judiciary exercising 
significant power in a democracy whose own composition reflects 
an apparent lack of fairness runs the serious risk of undermining its 
own authority (again illustrating the interconnectedness of these 
key ‘touchstones’ for judicial appointments). 
Furthermore, the law of the land effectively constitutes the collective 
moral code of society. From the perspective of the substantive 
decision-making of the courts themselves, it is therefore fundamental 
that those applying this law should be drawn from a cross spectrum 
of that society and thus carry with them (and be able to relate to) 
the broad array of perspectives and experiences that contribute to 
it.13 In this sense: 
“Diversity in the judiciary is not simply a desirable policy 
stance...It is an element of the delivery of justice that 
is increasingly vital for the judiciary’s legitimacy in a 
diverse society. Unlike virtually any other profession, 
a judiciary that operates in a diverse society must 
itself be diverse in order to fulfil its very function - the 
delivery of justice.”14 
Striking the balance in senior judicial appointments 
The challenge of identifying an appropriate system of appointing 
senior judges is by no means unique to the UK. In what has 
13 It is important to recognise that it is this – the diversity of views born of different life experience 
– that ‘diversity’ in judicial appointments should be taken as referring to. Gender and ethnicity, 
as the broadest categories of differing background and of particular significance in terms of 
perceived legitimacy due to their visible nature, will inevitably take prominence in a paper 
of this scope. However, the importance of other differing perspectives resulting from, for 
example, socio-economic status, sexuality and career background are of course also directly 
relevant. 
14 C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions: A review of 
research, policies, and practices’, The Commission for Judicial Appointments, November 
2005
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been recognised as a global ‘age of judicial power’, democratic 
jurisdictions across the world have been engaged in the search for 
the ‘elusive balance’ between these three guiding concepts.15
However, the evidence to the recent House of Lords Constitution 
Committee review on judicial appointment would suggest that there 
is a widespread feeling that the balance struck by the CRA 2005 
reforms in relation to senior judicial appointments is inappropriate 
and that change is required.1 This review has since been overtaken 
by a Ministry of Justice consultation on the same theme, raising 
the prospect of a Judicial Reform Bill at some point in the current 
parliamentary term.1 Indeed, for the former Lord Chancellor Jack 
Straw, the current appointments system for the senior judiciary is 
“unsustainable” as:
“There is plainly a lack of mutual confidence between the 
senior judiciary and this place [parliament] in respect 
of the role of the senior judiciary and its broadening 
authority into areas that are inevitably political.”18
As Lord Justice Etherton identifies, the key to resolving these issues 
“lies in a much more intense focus on the appointments process 
for th[e] higher courts in order to provide constitutional legitimacy 
for them within a democratic society”.19 This paper will attempt to 
provide just this focus. 
In doing so, it is important to stress that what is being analysed and 
at times criticised is the constitutional system as entirely divorced 
from the high calibre individuals presently involved in that system. 
The UK is very fortunate to have a generation of progressive 
and liberal judges on the bench, but it is only necessary to recall 
Conor Gearty’s alarm at the flood of “dreadful, coercive” public 
law decisions emerging from the English courts in the 1980s and 
early 1990s to see that this cannot and should not be factored into 
the system as a given.20 The very point of a robust constitutional 
structure of checks and balances is that it must be capable of 
15 K Malleson, “Introduction”, in K Malleson and P Russell (eds.), ‘Appointing Judges in an Age of 
Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World’, Canadian Public Administration, 
Volume 1, Issue 1, March 200
1 www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/lords-select/constitution-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/judicial-appointments-process/
1  consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/judicial-appointments-cp19-2011 
18 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011. As discussed in Chapter 1, 
evidence of this lack of confidence can be found in the increased tendency in recent decades for 
ministers to abandon the convention of not criticising individual judges or judicial decisions. 
19 Evidence before the constitution committee, Autumn 2011
20 C Gearty, ‘Can Human Rights Survive?’, The Hamlyn Lectures, Cambridge University Press 
(2005), p. 2
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withstanding less than ideal conditions (and it should therefore be 
designed with this in mind). 
In short, it is an eminently positive thing that today’s senior 
judiciary are required and able to provide just such a check on 
the executive. However, it is equally important that this power is 
itself buttressed by a constitutionally appropriate process of senior 
judicial appointments. Establishing such a process would therefore 
enhance not only the democratic legitimacy of the system as a whole 
but also – importantly - the authority of the judges themselves and 
the crucial role they perform. 
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1 – The expansion of judicial power:  
the new constitutional settlement
“The function of the legislature is to make the law...and 
the function of the judiciary is to interpret and enforce 
the law. The judiciary is not concerned with policy. It 
is not for the judiciary to decide what is in the public 
interest.”21
     Lord Greene 
Master of the Rolls, 1944
“It is an everyday occurrence for courts to consider, 
together with principled arguments, the balance sheet 
of policy advantages and disadvantages.”22
        
 Lord Steyn
2004
At the core of the move towards what Vernon Bogdanor has 
described as ‘The New British Constitution’ has been the expansion 
of judicial power vis-a-vis the other branches of state and the 
corresponding shift away from the traditional ‘balance of powers’ 
towards a purer ‘separation of powers’ model. 
The old orthodoxy was, as outlined by Lord Greene, characterised 
by a relatively restricted sphere of judicial influence and a 
correspondingly high degree of deference towards the elected 
legislature and the executive. However, in the 190s, the judges 
“belatedly roused themselves from their...stupor and sought to 
impose order on a burgeoning regulatory state.”23 Since then, 
the constitutional process of ‘judicialisation’ has gathered pace: 
the accession of the United Kingdom to the European Union, the 
21 W Greene, ‘Law and Progress’, 94 Law Journal 349, 1944
22 Lord Steyn, ‘Deference: A Tangled Story’, Judicial Studies Board Lecture: Belfast, 2 November 2004 
23 D Nicol, ‘Law and Politics after the Human Rights Act’, Public Law, 4, 2006, pp. 723-4
:
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exponential growth of judicial review of government decisions, 
the increased administrative role of the judiciary, the sovereignty 
implications of devolution, the incorporation of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) into domestic law and the 
establishment of the UK Supreme Court have all expanded the 
judicial remit within the constitutional framework, contributing 
towards a “quiet but profound revolution”.24
Many of these changes have, of course, been consciously mandated 
by politicians either through legislative acts or a more subtle 
off-loading of ‘too hot to handle’ topics (such as privacy and ‘right-
to-die’ issues). Others – particularly the transformation of judicial 
review as a remedy – have been primarily judge-led. However, the 
cumulative impact has been increasingly to draw the judiciary into 
the realm of governmental (in the broad sense) decision-making, 
with the effect that “the increase in the ‘small p’ political aspect in 
judging has been recognised by most fair minded commentators”.25 
As Lord Sumption recently observed:
“it is the experience of most practitioners and many 
commentators that the uncertain boundary between 
policy-making and implementation has become more 
porous....[and] the tendency of the courts to intervene 
in the making of ‘macro-policy’ has become more 
pronounced.”2
The development of judicial review
Sumption very clearly identifies the key driver behind this rise in the 
political significance of the judiciary as “the increasingly vigorous 
exercise of its powers of judicial review.”2
In 194 there were 10 applications for leave to seek judicial 
review in England and Wales. By 199 the figure was 4,39 and 
by 2005 there were upwards of 10,000 judicial review cases a 
year and climbing.28 Thus, according to Lord Phillips, “public law 
24 V Bogdanor, ‘Parliament and the judiciary: the problem of accountability’, lecture to the UK 
Public Administration Consortium, February 9 200. See also generally A Paterson, ‘Judges 
and the public good: reflections on the last Law Lords’ in A Paterson, “Lawyers and the Public 
Good: Democracy in Action”, Cambridge University Press, 2012
25 A Horne, ‘The Changing Constitution: A Case for Judicial Confirmation Hearings?’, Study of 
Parliament Group, London 2010. This excellent article has provided an invaluable resource in 
the writing of this chapter.
2 J Sumption Q.C, ‘Judicial and political decision-making the Uncertain Boundary’, F.A. Mann 
Lecture, 2011
2 ibid
28 A Horne, ‘The Changing Constitution: A Case for Judicial Confirmation Hearings?’, 2010
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now occupies about half of the time of the Supreme Court”.29 
Significantly, these cases frequently involve a direct consideration 
of the propriety of a particular policy undertaken by a governmental 
body or individual in relation to a variety of broad criteria. It is this 
that almost inevitably leads to the daily judicial consideration of, 
as Lord Steyn notes, ‘the balance sheet of policy advantages and 
disadvantages’. Indeed, for Lord Justice Etherton, the result is that 
the Supreme Court in particular “is now primarily a policy-making 
body”.30 
This exponential growth of the remedy of judicial review has 
coincided directly with – and must be viewed in the context of 
– an expansion of executive power, particularly in relation to the 
legislature. As such, it serves as an important check on the executive 
and as a safeguard of individual and minority rights. It therefore 
plays the key role in this context of upholding the rule of law, as 
identified by Lord Donaldson:
“It is the job of the judges to ensure that the government 
of the day does not exceed its powers, which is a 
permanent desire of all governments.”31
However, it is clear – and important to recognise – that this explosion 
in public law, while of real societal value, has empowered the 
judiciary and shifted the traditional balance between the different 
arms of state.
The incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law
The incorporation of the ECHR into domestic law under the Human 
Rights Act (“HRA”) 1998 is another factor that has, as Lady Hale 
identifies, “clearly increased the social and ‘small p’ political content 
of the judging task”.32 The Act effectively extends a form of judicial 
review to primary legislation, introducing an assessment of the 
‘proportionality’ of social policy measures that frequently turns on a 
judicial consideration of ‘what is necessary in a democratic society’. 
This unavoidably involves the judges in a difficult balancing act to 
determine what is in the public interest, which is “an inherently 
political exercise”.33
29 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
30 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
31 BBC, ‘Obituary: Lord Donaldson of Lymington’ July 2005, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/4204240.stm 
(last accessed on16 March 2012)
32 B Hale, ‘Equality in the Judiciary: A Tale of Two Continents Tenth Pilgrim Fathers’, Lecture, 
2003
33 Sumption, Mann lecture, 2011
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Once again, it is important to note the societal value and significance 
of the Act itself and the protection it provides for both individual 
and minority rights. This is particularly the case in the context of 
a powerful executive branch and a contemporary climate which 
is susceptible to occasional (often very understandable) knee-jerk 
reactions impacting on individual liberty. Indeed, the HRA has 
served to give concrete form to the right of an individual to be 
protected from undue interference with their liberty both from other 
individuals and, importantly, from the state itself, as advocated by 
liberal philosophers such as John Stuart Mill and John Locke. This 
explicit legal protection of fundamental human rights is nothing 
less than the hallmark of a mature democracy and any attempt to 
row back from this would be a highly negative step. 
Nonetheless, it is necessary to recognise that the incorporation of 
the ECHR into domestic law has also drawn the judiciary (particularly 
at its senior levels) further into the political realm by, in effect, 
requiring judges to give “moral answers to moral questions”.34
A challenge to parliamentary sovereignty?
This expansion of the constitutional role of the judiciary as a check on 
executive power has corresponded with an increasing recognition 
of the rule of law as “the basic foundation of our democracy”.35 
Indeed, some have asserted that, in certain circumstances, this 
concept can now trump parliamentary sovereignty, raising the 
possibility that an even more fundamental shift has occurred in the 
relationship between the courts and parliament. The most famous 
example comes from Lord Steyn: 
“The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of 
the supremacy of Parliament, pure and absolute as it 
was, can now be seen to be out of place in the modern 
United Kingdom....In exceptional circumstances 
involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the 
ordinary role of the courts...a new Supreme Court 
may have to consider whether this is a constitutional 
fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting 
at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons 
cannot abolish.”3
34 Lord Browne-Wilkinson, quoted in R Stevens, ‘Reform in haste and repent at leisure: lolanthe, 
the Lord High Executioner and Brave New World’, Legal Studies, Volume 24, Issue 1-2, pp. 
1-34, 2003
35 MOJ consultation paper, ‘Appointments and Diversity: A Judiciary for the 21st Century’, 2011
3 Lord Steyn, quoted in, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, ‘Jackson v Her Majesty’s Attorney General’, 
UKHL, 2005
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Although, so far as is known, not a majority view within the senior 
judiciary, similar comments can be found from Lady Hale and Lords 
Hope, Woolf and Phillips.3 However, the very presence of these 
assertions in mainstream discussion is evidence of the distance 
travelled from Lord Greene’s traditional stance. In constitutional 
theory, the courts do remain limited by parliamentary sovereignty. 
In practice, however, this limitation has been significantly diluted by 
membership of the European Union, the incorporation of the ECHR 
and the political implications of any attempt to repel judicial attempts 
to uphold fundamental constitutional rights. This divergence is well 
illustrated by Jack Straw: 
“It is all very well saying that Section 4 [of the HRA] 
is very elegant because all it does is provide for a 
declaration of incompatibility.[38] That is true; legislation 
cannot be overruled—but, by God, the moment that 
happens, there is an unexploded bomb in the middle 
of a Minister’s room and you have to work out what 
to do with it.”39 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and a new Supreme Court
The explicit move towards a purer ‘separation of powers’ contained 
in the CRA 2005 both evidenced and further enhanced this expanded 
role of the judiciary. Due in part to the increased judicial involvement 
in the sphere of political decision making, it was rightly deemed 
inappropriate to retain the previous degree of interconnectivity 
between the judiciary and the other branches of state if the key 
principle of judicial independence was to be protected (both in 
fact and appearance). As such, the highest court in the land was 
removed from its seat within the legislature and the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court was created. At the same time, the appointment of 
judges ceased to be largely the preserve of the executive, with the 
judiciary itself taking on a far more influential role in the process 
3 Phillips: “If parliament did the inconceivable, we might do the inconceivable as well...one is 
envisaging a situation where a strong majority in parliament enacted a piece of legislation that 
produced a complete public outcry because it was opposed to some fundamental constitutional 
principle, then one might say that the Supreme Court might react”. The Today Programme, 
BBC Radio4, August 2, 2010. 
38 If a court determines that a statutory provision breaches the HRA, it cannot directly strike 
out the offending section. Instead, it must inform parliament by issuing a ‘declaration of 
incompatibility’, therefore technically leaving any subsequent alteration of the legislation 
to parliament’s discretion. It is worth noting, however, that in every case to date in which 
the courts have issued a declaration of incompatibility, parliament has acted to amend the 
relevant legislation. 
39 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011. It is worth noting that in every 
case to date in which the courts have issued a declaration of incompatibility, Parliament has 
acted to amend the relevant legislation.
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as part of the newly formed independent appointing commissions 
(discussed in detail in Chapter 2), thus filling the power vacuum 
created by the executive’s recusal. 
In reality, the new Supreme Court possesses few more powers than 
its former incarnation in the House of Lords. Although in this sense 
the move was largely symbolic, “symbols can have unexpected 
results”.40 As the Lord Chancellor responsible for implementing the 
changes puts it:
“The Supreme Court will be bolder in vindicating both 
the freedoms of individuals and, coupled with that, 
being willing to take on the executive.”41
Thus, for Kate Malleson, the impact of form on substance will 
ensure that:
“The establishment of a new body, bearing the title 
of Supreme Court with a clear and distinct identity, 
housed in its own building is likely to accelerate the 
trend towards a strengthening judicial role.”42 
Tension between the executive and the judiciary
It is perhaps unsurprising that such a significant rise in the power 
of the judiciary vis-a-vis the other branches of government should 
lead to heightened tensions, particularly in relation to the executive, 
whose power the judges have increasingly looked to restrain. 
Thus, the last 20 years have been marked by frequently strained 
relationships between government ministers and the judiciary 
(although matters did improve in the era of Lord Bingham and Lord 
Falconer), leading a former Attorney General, Lord Rawlinson, to 
recently state that – in 50 years experience - he had never known 
“such antagonism as there is at the moment between the judiciary 
and the executive”43. 
The Constitution Committee has heard that, contrary to convention, 
members at all levels of the judiciary have found themselves 
“somewhat under siege as a result of political criticism”.44 Prime 
40 Lord Woolf, ‘The Pursuit of Justice’, ed. by Christopher Campbell-Holt, Oxford University 
Press, 2008, p. 12
41 Lord Falconer, quoted in K Malleson, ‘The evolving role of the Supreme Court’, Public Law, 
October 2011 pp. 54-2
42 K Malleson, ‘The evolving role of the Supreme Court’, Public Law, 2011
43 Quoted in A Horne, ‘The Changing Constitution: A Case for Judicial Confirmation Hearings?’, 
2010
44 Plumstead, evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011 
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Ministers, Home Secretaries and other ministers from across the 
political spectrum have openly attacked judicial decisions: Tony 
Blair criticised an asylum decision as ‘an abuse of common sense’45, 
David Cameron weighed in on the undesirability of the perceived 
(and much publicised) judicial development of privacy law4, Labour 
Home Secretaries Blunkett and Clarke were near apoplectic in 
relation to a series of security matters and Theresa May has recently 
been embroiled in a debate concerning a cat.4
Whilst a degree of tension between the separate arms of state 
is not necessarily a bad thing, there is a real sense in which the 
contemporary climate is potentially corrosive of judicial authority 
and therefore also legitimacy and independence itself. Indeed, 
the key thrust of this executive criticism is invariably linked to the 
perceived expansion of the judicial role into the political sphere 
without any notable corresponding increase in the accountability 
for that power. Attacks on the legitimacy of ‘unaccountable’, 
‘unelected’ judges acting in a manner characterised as “dismissive 
of the elected Parliament”48 have become the standard refrain.
The myth of ‘mechanical jurisprudence’
It is precisely this lack of any corresponding increase in accountability 
that leaves the judiciary vulnerable to criticisms in relation to their 
new role. Without a more solid basis to justify their expanded 
power, some members of the judiciary have given the impression 
of embracing a theory of ‘mechanical jurisprudence’ in the face of 
such attacks. Thus, for the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Judge: 
“the introduction of the European dimension to our law 
and the increasing use of judicial review of government 
action in particular has not altered the basic principle, 
which is that we try to discover the law, and...having 
discovered it, we say what it is” [emphasis added].49
Similarly, for Lord Kerr, the Supreme Court is emphatically not 
involved in “the creation of policy”: “We are not creating law; 
45 BBC, ‘Blair dismay over hijack Afghans’, May 2006, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/47723.stm (last 
accessed on 16 March 2012)
4 Owen Bowcott, ‘Privacy law should be made by MPs, not judges, says David Cameron, April 
2011, www.guardian.co.uk/media/2011/apr/21/cameron-superinjunctions-parliament-should-
decide-law (last accessed 16 March 2012)
4 www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-151032
48 J Denham MP, ‘This is a clash between the courts and elected MPs’, Independent, 30 June 
200
49 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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we are applying the law” [emphasis added].50 This image of the 
judge as the finder of buried treasure rather than the exerciser of 
creative choices is hard to square with Lord Bingham’s views on 
the judge as law maker51 and Lord Reid’s 192 dismissal of the 
notion of mechanical jurisprudence: “we don’t believe in fairy tales 
anymore”.52 Lord Radcliffe was equally forthright:
“[T]here was never a more sterile controversy than that 
upon the question whether a judge makes laws. Of 
course he does. How can he help it?”53 
As Robert Stevens notes, the attempt to protect the judicial role 
by effectively pretending nothing has changed has more than a 
little of the reasoning of Alice in Wonderland about it: if we say 
it often enough then it will be true.54 To see the unsustainability 
of this position, however, one only needs to read Lord Sumption’s 
recent concern over “the judicial resolution of inherently political 
issues”55. The genie is, in effect, out of the bottle, and no amount of 
wilful denial will squeeze it back in. If (as we do) we want to retain 
a robust judiciary with real power to protect individual and minority 
rights from executive excess, then it is something that must be 
addressed. 
Putting judicial power on a more solid footing
For some, including Sumption himself, the appropriate response 
to the shift in the boundaries between political and legal decision 
making is for the judiciary to retreat to the “shallow end”.5 However, 
this solution is deeply problematic. Whatever the historical and 
constitutional ideal, the current position regarding executive power 
is clearly that described by Sir Jack Beatson: “while the House of 
Commons in theory controls the government, save exceptionally, it 
is the government which controls the House”.5
Both in relation to the expanded powers of judicial review and the 
50 Indeed, in every case to date in which the courts have issued a declaration of incompatibility, 
Parliament has acted to amend the relevant legislation.
51 T Bingham, ‘In The Business of Judging’, Oxford University Press, 2000
52 Lord Reid, ‘The judge as law maker’, 12 Journal of the Public Society of Teachers of Law 22, 
192
53 Quoted in R Stevens, ‘The English Judges: Their Role in the Changing Constitution’, Hart 
Publishing, 2002 p33
54 R Stevens, ‘Reform in haste and repent at leisure’, Legal Studies, 2003
55 Sumption, Mann lecture, 2011
5 C Gearty, ‘Are judges now out of their depth?’, JUSTICE Tom Sargant memorial annual lecture, 
London, October 200
5 Justice Beatson, ‘Reforming an Unwritten Constitution’, 31st Blackstone Lecture, Pembroke 
College, 16 May 2009
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preservation of fundamental human rights, the judiciary fulfils a 
key constitutional and social function in the protection of individual 
and minority rights within our democracy. Indeed, so vital is it 
that, for some, the imperative of preserving it almost precludes 
the introduction of any significant measures to make the judiciary 
accountable for the power they wield. Thus, Aharon Barack, former 
president of the Supreme Court of Israel, argues that someone has 
to protect the fundamental rights of the minority in a democracy 
and fully independent judges are the best (or perhaps ‘least worst’) 
solution.58 As Roger Smith of JUSTICE puts it, “I think that the 
question [is]: who guards the guards? I think that it has to be the 
judges.”59
However, this is itself equally unacceptable in a democratic society. 
By definition, ‘self-guarding guardians’ belong in an oligarchy 
not in a democracy in which authority is derived directly (and 
exclusively) from the body politic. Furthermore, as is evident, any 
such accountability deficit is highly problematic in the context of 
democratic decision-making, leaving the judiciary a hostage to 
attack.
It follows that it is instead necessary to explore mechanisms 
that can inject a degree of accountability into the system without 
undermining judicial independence. Only by achieving this can the 
expanded judicial role be put on a sufficiently solid footing. The 
paramount importance of preserving the independence of sitting 
judges ensures that the key to this is, as outlined in the following 
chapter, to focus on the process by which judges – particularly those 
in the more politically significant senior courts – are appointed.0 
By doing so it is possible to enhance the legitimacy of the judges 
themselves and the role they perform and thus benefit both the 
judiciary and the society it serves. 
58 A Barak, ‘The Judge in a Democracy’, Princeton University Press, 200
59 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
0 See generally A Paterson, ‘Judges and the public good: reflections on the last Law Lords’ in A 
Paterson, “Lawyers and the Public Good: Democracy in Action”, Cambridge University Press, 
2012
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2 – Current senior judicial appointments:  
the democratic deficit
“Journalists, academics, and politicians will become 
more aware of this powerful institution, and questions 
will be asked about the way its members are chosen. 
The failure to address the democratic deficit in the 
selection process to the Supreme Court is likely to 
become increasingly problematic.”1
  Professor Kate Malleson
 
At the heart of the attempt to find the ‘elusive balance’ between the 
touchstones of accountability and independence in relation to the 
senior judiciary is the process by which they are appointed. Once 
appointed it is, rightly, virtually impossible to remove a sitting judge 
– this protection is an essential aspect of judicial independence. It 
is therefore only at the appointments stage of the process that the 
necessary degree of accountability – and with it legitimacy - can be 
introduced into the system in a manner that does not significantly 
impact on independence. Indeed, as outlined in the introduction, the 
legitimacy of the judicial branch to adjudicate on the laws passed 
by elected officials rests heavily on the constitutional legitimacy of 
the appointments system by which the judges come to hold this 
power in a democratic society. 
Senior judicial appointments process in theory
The background and CRA 2005
Historically, the appointment of judges at all levels in England 
and Wales has been under the control and at the choice of the 
Lord Chancellor (with support from his department and some 
1 K Malleson, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of Supreme Court nominees: a view from the United 
Kingdom’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Volume 44, Issue 3, 200
:
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limited input from the wider judiciary). As the power of the senior 
judiciary increased, however, politicians rightly (although perhaps 
somewhat paradoxically) came to accept that a purer separation of 
powers requires that the executive play a much reduced role in the 
appointment of its fellow branch of government. The question was, 
therefore, who would fill the power vacuum when the executive 
stepped back. Understandably, given their expertise in what judging 
requires, it was thought – both by themselves and others – that the 
judges should step into the breach.2 
Accordingly, three independent appointing commissions were 
established with a heavy judicial influence: the Judicial Appointment 
Commissions of England and Wales and of Northern Ireland and 
(with rather less judicial sway) the Judicial Appointments Board in 
Scotland (together, ‘the regional JACs’). These permanent statutory 
bodies are now responsible for appointments to the High Court and 
below and are composed exclusively of judges, lawyers and lay 
persons (i.e. there is no political membership). 
For senior judicial posts, however, the CRA 2005 mandates 
that separate, ad-hoc appointing commissions – composed in 
accordance with stipulated statutory criteria - should be convened 
as and when a relevant vacancy arises. An examination of these 
commissions reveals a significant issue, one in fact anticipated with 
some prescience by Tom Legg, former Permanent Secretary to the 
Lord Chancellor’s Department:
“It is hard to imagine such [commissions] without a 
contingent of senior judges. They would inevitably 
have a heavy, and often a predominating, influence. 
It is no reflection on our judges to say that this would 
be undesirable. No branch of government should be 
effectively self-perpetuating.”3 [emphasis added]
Supreme Court appointment process64
For each separate Supreme Court selection process, a new five-
member selection commission is convened. This panel is always 
chaired by the current President of the Court. The second member is 
the Deputy President of the Court. The other positions on the ad-hoc 
2 For greater detail on the development of the CRA 2005 judicial appointments processes see 
A Paterson, ‘Judges and the public good: reflections on the last Law Lords’ in A Paterson, 
“Lawyers and the Public Good: Democracy in Action”, Cambridge University Press, 2012
3 T Legg, ‘Judges for the New Century’, Public Law, Volume 62, Issue 73, 2001
4 The procedure for appointing a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom is 
governed by Sections 25 to 31 and Schedule 8 of the CRA 2005.
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panel are filled by a member from each of the regional permanent 
JACs (as selected by the Chairman of the relevant JAC). At least one 
of these members must be a lay person. There is no stipulation as 
to the need for a gender or ethnicity mix on the selecting panel. 
Parliament has explicitly affirmed in CRA 200 that- as an alternative 
to having held high judicial office for at least two years - anyone 
with 15 years practising experience as either a solicitor or a barrister 
may apply to fill a Supreme Court vacancy.
As part of the selection process, the ad-hoc appointing commission 
is required to consult on the merits of prospective Supreme Court 
candidates with a stipulated list of individuals including other 
members of the senior judiciary (including all remaining Supreme 
Court justices, the Lord Chief Justice and the Master of the Rolls), 
the Lord Chancellor, the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales and 
the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.5
The appointing panel is required to make a selection ‘on merit’. 
In doing so, it must ensure “that between them the Judges [of the 
Supreme Court] will have knowledge of, and experience of practice 
in, the law of each part of the United Kingdom”. This requirement 
is designed to ensure that there is continued representation from 
both Scotland and Northern Ireland on the Supreme Court.
Once the panel has concluded on a single name for a vacancy, this 
is passed to the Lord Chancellor who must carry out another round 
of consultations with the same individuals listed in the statute. The 
Lord Chancellor then retains a limited right of veto and can reject 
once the name put forward by the panel (but is afterwards bound 
by their second selection). This veto power is entirely negative in 
substance (i.e. it does not allow the Lord Chancellor to indicate a 
preferred candidate).
Appointments process for other senior judicial roles
Lord Chief Justice68
Under the CRA 2005 the Lord Chief Justice became the head of the 
judiciary and President of the Courts of England and Wales. With 
the move towards a purer separation of powers, this role took on far 
5 Although due to devolution issues, it is understood that the Northern Ireland consultee is 
now in practice the chair of the respective JAC, the Chief Justice of Northern Ireland (who is 
therefore effectively consulted twice). 
 Section 2 (5) CRA 2005 
 Section 2 (8) CRA 2005
8 See sections  – 5 CRA 2005
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greater significance, with increased administrative (in relation to the 
expanded judicial responsibilities over the operation of the courts) 
and political (as a liaison with the other branches of government) 
functions.
The Lord Chief Justice is appointed by a four person ad-hoc panel 
chaired by the most senior England and Wales Supreme Court 
Justice who is not disqualified (e.g. by being a candidate). In the 
event of a tie, the chair has a casting vote. The second member of 
the panel is a member of the senior judiciary chosen at the discretion 
of the chair. The third member is the Chair of the England and 
Wales JAC who also selects the fourth member from among the lay 
membership of that JAC. The single name put forward by this panel 
is appointed, subject to the same limited veto power from the Lord 
Chancellor as exists in relation to Supreme Court appointments.
Heads of Division69
The Heads of Division are the most senior judges at the apex of the 
separate strands of the judiciary (contained within the High Court 
and the Court of Appeal). Again, due to the greater separation of 
powers and increase in the judicial control over the court system, 
these roles have increased in constitutional significance under CRA 
2005. These Heads of Division are appointed in the same way as 
the Lord Chief Justice with the exception that the Lord Chief Justice 
himself becomes the second member of the panel. The most senior 
England and Wales Supreme Court judge remains the chair with a 
casting vote where necessary.
Court of Appeal judges70
Court of appeal judges are also appointed by a four person panel, 
with the Lord Chief Justice as chair (with a casting vote where 
necessary). The second member is a current Court of Appeal judge 
or Head of Division chosen at the discretion of the Lord Chief Justice. 
The third and fourth members are selected in the same way as for 
the Lord Chief justice, with the Lord Chancellor retaining the same 
limited veto.
9 See sections  – 5 CRA 2005
0 See sections  - 84 CRA 2005
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Senior judicial appointments process in practice
Judicial influence on appointing panels
It is therefore very clear that in relation to the appointments process 
for each of the individual roles within the senior judiciary, the senior 
judiciary itself is playing a pivotal role. 
In the appointment of the Lord Chief Justice, the Heads of Division 
and Court of Appeal judges, the casting vote given to the chairman 
ensures that there is a majority judicial influence on every single 
appointing panel. 
In relation to the Supreme Court specifically, two of the five members 
on any panel will always be the President and Deputy President of 
the Supreme Court itself (even when appointing their own direct 
replacements). This is already a heavy (and indeed, exceptionally 
powerful) judicial presence:
“These two judges, the most senior in the entire 
judiciary, must in practice have a predominant 
influence over the three representatives of the United 
Kingdom appointment commissions who comprise the 
remainder of the commission.”1 [emphasis added]
In practice, however, the judicial influence on appointments to these 
positions is greater than this. To date there have been four panels 
convened to appoint new Justices of the Supreme Court using the 
procedure stipulated in the CRA 2005.2 On every occasion, the two 
Supreme Court justices have been joined by another serving judge 
from a lower court. This has ensured that in relation to the eight 
Supreme Court justices appointed under the procedures, there has 
always been a majority of judges on the appointing panel itself. 
It is also likely to have the further effect of again increasing the 
influence of current Supreme Court members in the appointment of 
their colleagues, as Lord Justice Etherton notes:
“You can see there the difficulties of the dynamics of 
having a junior judge on the United Kingdom Supreme 
Court appointments panel with the President and the 
Deputy President. The dynamics there are very, very 
difficult.”3
1 T Legg, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
2 The first being a voluntary use of the procedure before the Act officially came into force.
3 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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This influence is enhanced still further by the process of statutory 
consultations, which feed in the views of every Supreme Court 
Justice on every candidate. This inevitably means that the Supreme 
Court is playing a very large part in the determination of its own 
composition. 
A standard Supreme Court appointment process
It is worth breaking this process down in detail. In total, a 
standard Supreme Court appointment process currently 
involves the direct input of up to 2 individuals, 20 of whom 
are members of the senior judiciary and one is a more 
junior judge (the remainder being the lay commissioners 
and the other statutory consultees). However, in practice, 
the judicial influence is again even greater. The input of 
the Lord Chancellor is, as discussed, primarily that of 
a negative veto that operates only at the very end of the 
process and, according to Lord Falconer, it is his experience 
that the relevant First Ministers do not treat Supreme Court 
appointments “as a particularly high-priority issue”.4 
Furthermore, it is understood that the Northern Ireland 
consultee is now in practice the chair of the regional JAC 
- mandated to be the most senior Northern Ireland judge 
- rather than the Secretary of State.
As a result, the key contributions to the assessment of the 
merits and demerits of all candidates5 for appointment 
to the apex of the judiciary come from around 21 judges 
(20 of them from within the senior judiciary) and two lay 
members. It would be difficult to get clearer evidence of the 
potential danger for this branch of government to become a 
“self-perpetuating oligarchy”.
At the core of the rationale behind affording the senior judiciary 
such a dominant influence in the appointment of the senior judiciary 
appears to be an extension of the attempt to protect judicial 
independence in the context of the separation of powers. However, 
this is a fundamental misconception:
4 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
5 It is understood that consultations are currently carried out prior even to the short-listing of 
candidates.
 It is important to note that this is not to imply that the lay members do not make significant, 
robust contributions to the work of the panel, but simply to illustrate that the sheer weight of 
numbers is stacked against them.
 R Stevens, ‘Reform in haste and repent at leisure: lolanthe, the Lord High Executioner and 
Brave New World’, Legal Studies, Volume 24, Issue 1-2, pp. 1-34, 2003
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“Of course the separation of powers is an important 
underlying factor in the appointment and operation of 
the judges, but that principle cannot be an absolute one 
in relation to the appointment of judges because the 
judges cannot be purely a self-appointing body.”8
It is in no way disrespectful to the judges themselves to recognise 
that it is deeply problematic in a democracy for one branch of 
state to have anything like a decisive voice in choosing their own 
colleagues and successors.
The inability to promote succession planning
One largely unremarked weakness of the system of ad hoc appointing 
panels for senior judicial appointments relates to the lack of 
machinery or impetus to promote succession planning. By definition, 
these panels are concerned with a ‘snap-shot’ picture and lack a 
consistency of membership or approach. With the retention of 0 as 
the retirement age for most Supreme Court justices, any candidate 
who works their way through the High Court and the Court of Appeal 
will have to be appointed at a comparatively young age if they are 
to stay for long in the Supreme Court. The turnover in the Supreme 
Court membership between 2009 and 2013 will be over 50%, raising 
issues of continuity. What is required is a process whereby, as in the 
days of appointment by the Lord Chancellor, the appointing body 
can actively take account of the longer term institutional needs of the 
senior judiciary and the Supreme Court in particular. 
The potential for conflicts of interest
As outlined above, each Supreme Court appointment involves 
a process of statutory consultations with members of the senior 
judiciary (along with a limited number of relevant political figures). 
In addition to the increased opportunity for self replication, this 
process also carries other significant problems. The first is that it 
“can be seen as riven by potential conflicts of interests”9, with those 
being consulted on the merits of each candidate perhaps inevitably 
having potentially close links with colleagues who are applying. 
Similarly, the current composition of the Supreme Court appointing 
panel itself has no satisfactory mechanism for dealing with conflicts 
of interest in relation to the President and Deputy President of the 
Court. The second related issue is that parliament’s express wish 
8 Lord Justice Etherton, evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
9 F Gibb, ‘Supreme ambition, jealousy and outrage’, The Times, 4 February 2010
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to leave appointments to the highest court open to high quality 
candidates from non-traditional (i.e. non-judicial) backgrounds 
can come into conflict with an apparent sentiment among some 
members of the senior judiciary that Supreme Court appointees 
should first ‘earn their spurs’ in the Court of Appeal.
Both of these issues became apparent in recent Supreme Court 
appointments processes.80 In 2008, Jonathan Sumption QC was 
given a clear indication that he would be the next Supreme Court 
appointee when Lord Neuberger left to become Master of the Rolls. 
According to Frances Gibb (and Joshua Rozenberg), however, the 
proposed appointment of Sumption caused much consternation 
among some members of the senior judiciary, who objected to 
the promotion of a practising barrister ‘over the heads’ of serving 
members of the Court of Appeal (who had worked their way through 
the judicial ranks). As such, Gibb asserts that his appointment was 
“effectively blocked after concerted opposition from Court of Appeal 
judges...backed by some Supreme Court judges”.81
Although Sumption was appointed to the Supreme Court in a later 
contest, this episode suggests that there is a school of thought within 
senior judicial ranks which prefers to approach appointments to the 
highest court in a narrower manner than the words that parliament 
has used.82 If unchecked, this line of thinking will inhibit diversity 
in appointments and may well explain the relative homogeneity of 
career paths onto the UK Supreme Court in direct contrast to other 
jurisdictions, where “most other top courts draw their members 
from a far wider range of career backgrounds”.83 
The need to address the democratic deficit
The push for a purer separation of powers and the corresponding 
removal of judicial appointments from the hands of the executive 
was understandable and appropriate in the context of the enhanced 
role of the judiciary. However, this removal of the executive left a 
vacuum and it is a vacuum that has, in large part, been filled by the 
judiciary itself. We have, in effect, “gone from one extreme to the 
other”.84 
80 See F Gibb, ‘Judges oppose appointment of Sumption QC to the Supreme Court’, The Times, 
15 October 2009 and ‘Supreme ambition, jealousy and outrage’, The Times, 4 February 2010
81 F Gibb, ‘Supreme ambition, jealousy and outrage’, The Times, 4 February 2010
82 Section 25 of the CRA 2005 expressly opens up appointments to the Supreme Court from out 
with the Court of Appeal.
83 K Malleson, ‘Appointments to the House of Lords: who goes upstairs’ in L Blom-Cooper, B 
Dickson and G Drewry (eds), “The Judicial House of Lords 18-2009”, 2009. This also has 
significant implications in terms of diversity as discussed in Chapter 4.
84 Lady Hale, evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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It is fully understandable that the judges should feel that they know 
best what the ‘judging job’ requires and this expertise should 
unquestionably be given its place. However, the extent of the judicial 
involvement in the current system of appointments is problematic 
in a mature democracy. This is particularly so in relation to the 
Supreme Court appointing panel which effectively “sets the tone 
for the whole of the judiciary”.85 In the context of the increasingly 
porous boundaries between legal and political decision making, the 
constitutional implications of appointments to this institution are 
profound. 
In relation to this there has been, quite rightly, a significant focus 
on the inappropriateness – explicitly recognised by Lord Philips 
himself – of the President of the Supreme Court chairing the panel 
that appoints his own successor. This is flawed not just from a 
constitutional perspective but from a basic HR stance and is clearly 
unsustainable.8 However, to concentrate on this at the expense 
of the more fundamental problems with the broad make-up of 
the Supreme Court appointing panel and the wider appointments 
process is to become fixated on the icing and neglect the cake. The 
broader, dominant extent to which the senior judiciary is involved 
in the selection of the senior judiciary is, as Lord Justice Etherton 
notes, “quite unacceptable...for constitutional legitimacy”.8
As outlined in the introduction, at the heart of the defining concept 
of the rule of law is compliance based on legitimacy. To return to 
the key touchstone of accountability, the legitimate exercise of 
power in the political sphere in a democratic society requires some 
degree of connection between the office holder in question and 
the public from whom that power is derived. As Lady Hale notes, 
the process of Supreme Court appointments “currently lacks any 
democratic accountability”88 – it involves no input whatsoever 
from the legislature, minimal input from the executive and actually 
requires no participant with a substantive role to be an elected 
office-holder. While undoubtedly crucial, judicial independence 
cannot be an absolute. 
Particularly in light of the new constitutional settlement, it is 
important to recognise that the appointment of senior judges is, 
in the broad sense, a political act. As such, it is “for the long-term 
health, quality and therefore standing and independence of the 
85 Baroness Neuberger, evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
8 See Jack Straw’s comment to the Constitution Committee that such a procedure would “not 
be acceptable anywhere these days”.
8 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
88 Written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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senior judiciary [that] there should also be an equal involvement of 
[the] other branches of government”.89 In the context of the expanded 
role and political significance of the judiciary, it is more important 
than ever to protect the legitimacy of this branch of government 
by ensuring that it is buttressed by a constitutionally appropriate 
appointments process. The current method of appointing our 
senior judiciary – and our Supreme Court Justices in particular – is, 
in short, not fit for purpose. 
89 T Legg, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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3 – Current senior judicial make-up: 
the diversity deficit
“The present imbalance between male and female, 
white and black in the judiciary is obvious…. I have 
no doubt that the balance will be redressed in the next 
few years.”90
Lord Taylor
Lord Chief Justice, 1992
“A woman litigant should be able to go into the Court 
and see more than one person who shares at least 
some of her experience. I should not stick out like a 
bad tooth, as I do at present.”91
  Lady Hale
Supreme Court Justice, 2012
The third touchstone in judicial appointments is that of diversity: 
the concept that the institutional legitimacy of the judiciary as a 
branch of government is in some way linked to its reflection of the 
society it serves.
Current senior judicial make-up
The make-up of the judiciary from the High Court level and above is 
set out in Figure 2. This might loosely be described as the ‘politically 
significant’ judiciary – the judges involved in the day to day review 
of government decision-making outlined in Chapter 1. The lack of 
diversity is striking. 
The picture is even starker in relation to the senior judiciary – those 
at the apex of the judicial branch of government with a significant 
involvement in the political sphere (as set out in Figure 3). Of these 
90 C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions: A review of 
research, policies, and practices’, The Commission for Judicial Appointments, November 
2005
91 Written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
:
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Figure 1 – estimated UK population break downi1
Female
Male
BAME
White British
49%51% 83%17%
Figure 2 – composition of judiciary at High Court level and aboveii2
Female
Male
BAME
White British
87%13% 98%
2%
Figure 3 – composition of the senior judiciaryiii3
Female
Male
BAME
White British
91%9% 100%
Figure 4 – composition of the Supreme Courtiv4
Female
Male
BAME
White British
8% 92% 100%
i ONS data
ii Compiled from www.judiciary.gov.uk/publications-and-reports/statistics/diversity-stats-and-gen-
overview and www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/judges-magistrates-and-tribunal-judges/
list-of-members-of-the-judiciary/senior-judiciary-list 
iii ibid 
iv ibid 
Guarding the guardians?

54 senior positions (comprising the Lord Chief Justice, the Heads of 
Division and the judges of the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court), 
only five (around 9%) are held by women and none at all (0%) by 
individuals of BAME origin. This marks an increase of only four 
senior female judges in the 20 years since Lord Taylor’s comment 
– an average of one more every five years. 
Perhaps most importantly, the highest court in the land itself 
– described by Lord Justice Etherton as “now primarily a policy-
making body”92 – is composed of 11 white men and one white 
woman. Thus, as the comparative international table in Figure 5 
makes abundantly clear:
“There is a real possibility that the continued failure of 
the system to increase judicial diversity will weaken our 
international standing among the leading judiciaries of 
the world, which now have significant numbers of women 
judges at the higher levels and in leadership positions.”93 
Or, as Roger Smith of JUSTICE more succinctly puts it: “We are 
shamed by the picture of our Supreme Court when placed against 
the [international] equivalents”94. 
From this evidence, the spectacular failure of Lord Taylor’s prediction 
to come to fruition is all too apparent. Indeed, this striking failure 
of the judiciary to reflect society is now the judiciary’s ‘Achilles 
Heel’ as seemingly “the main thing that lay persons know about 
our judges”.95 
However, although most senior judges and commentators now 
accept that diversity is a significant problem, they are sharply divided 
as to what should be done about it. Indeed, while witness after 
witness before the Constitution Committee in the autumn of 2011 
lamented the failure to make significant progress, only a minority 
were prepared to countenance reform that would have an impact at 
the senior end of the judiciary within the foreseeable future. Despite 
the failure of the ‘trickle up’ theory to have any notable impact in the 
last 20 years, there are still those advocating patience. Indeed, the 
Lord Chancellor himself has commented that: 
“The steady increase in the number of women on the 
Bench and the seniority at which they occur, ethnic 
92 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
93 Lady Justice Arden, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
94 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
95 S Turenne, ‘Vacancies at the Supreme Court’, Cambridge Student Law Review, Volume 4, 
2011
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minority representation ... it is all coming along steadily...
I hope the process continues.”9 
It is worth noting that, should the ‘process’ continue at the same 
rate it has in the period since Lord Taylor’s comment, gender parity 
alone in the senior judiciary will take almost a century to attain. 
Speaking bluntly, it is unlikely that the credibility of our judiciary 
can wait even a further two decades. As Malleson indicates, the lack 
of diversity is in real danger of having a “corrosive impact...on the 
legitimacy of the judiciary [which] is now too great to ignore”.9 There 
have so far been eight appointments using the CRA 2005 Supreme 
Court appointing procedures; all eight have been white men. The 
very health of the judiciary itself necessitates the recognition that 
“the pace of change is too slow and something needs to be done 
about it urgently”.98 Positive noises are simply no longer enough.
The constitutional rationale for a diverse judiciary
It is important to emphasise that the absence of a diverse judiciary 
raises fundamental constitutional issues. The first is the normative 
recognition that, in a democracy, the authority of the judicial branch 
of government rests heavily on its perceived legitimacy and a 
central aspect of this legitimacy is its relationship to and reflection 
of the society it serves:
“In the contemporary world, where democratic 
commitments oblige equal access to power...the 
composition of a judiciary – if all-white or all-male or 
all-upper class – becomes a problem of equality and 
legitimacy.”99
Similarly, Lady Hale argues that:
“I believe that the lack of diversity on the Bench is a 
constitutional issue. Judges both enforce the law 
against the people and protect the people against the 
state. Everybody should be able to see the courts as 
their courts, there for all sections of society and not just 
for some. Fairness and equality are central values in the 
law and the courts should reflect this.”100 
9 Annual meeting of the Lord Chancellor with the Constitution Committee, 19 January, 2011 
9 K Malleson, “The new judicial appointments commission in England and Wales”, in K Malleson 
and P Russell eds., ‘Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power’, 200 
98 Lady Justice Arden, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
99 J Resnik, ‘Judicial selection and democratic theory: demand, supply and life tenure’, 2 
Cardozo L. Rev. 59 2004-2005 
100 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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Figure 5 – international comparison of the representation of 
women in senior courts101
Country Court Number 
of women 
judges
Total number 
of judges
Representation 
of women 
as %
International 
Criminal Court
11 18 1.1%
Canada Supreme Court 4 9 44.4%
Australia High Court 3  42.9%
European Court 
of Human 
Rights
19 4 40.4%
Sweden Supreme Court  1 3.5%
Norway Supreme Court  19 3.8%
USA Supreme Court 3 9 33.3%
Germany Federal 
Constitutional 
Court
5 1 31.3%
Israel Supreme Court 4 15 2.%
Denmark Supreme Court 5 19 2.3%
South 
Africa
Constitutional 
Court
2 10 20%
European Court 
of Justice
5 2 18.5%
Iceland Supreme Court 2 12 1.%
UK Supreme 
Court
1 12 8.3%
101 Figures valid as at February 2012; data collected from court websites or correspondence 
with the respective courts. This table represents an updated and expanded version of that 
submitted in written evidence to the Constitution Committee by Erika Rackley (Autumn 2011).
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At the very core of the authority of the judiciary – and indeed the 
claims for and right to significant independence – is its perceived 
ability to deliver ‘fairness’. Research clearly indicates that a more 
representative judiciary is linked to increased public perception 
of the fairness of courts.102 A judiciary (and a court) that is marked 
by such an apparent lack of fairness and equality in terms of its 
composition cannot help but risk significantly undermining its own 
long-term legitimacy and therefore authority. 
The second rationale is of a more substantive nature and relates to 
the actual decision making of the courts themselves. The law of the 
land represents the collective moral code of society and applies in 
relation to the acts and experiences of all sections of that society. As 
an institution, a judiciary that is able to relate to that society – which 
is imbued with the diverse range of experiences and perspectives 
that contribute to it – is therefore better placed to deliver justice in 
that society. In other words:
“a diverse judiciary is, all other things being equal, a 
better judiciary. It is better not (just) because it is more 
representative and democratically legitimate, but 
because it is better positioned to do the job assigned 
to it – to do justice. A judiciary is stronger, and the 
justice dispensed better, where its decision-making 
is informed by a wider array of perspectives and 
experiences.”103 [emphasis added]
The reason for this is that, because they are ‘men not disembodied 
spirits’, judicial decisions are inevitably influenced by judicial 
character and experience.104 This fact has been recognised so 
frequently that it should no longer be controversial. As Beverley 
McLachlin, Chief Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court has said, 
“jurists are human beings and, as such, are informed and influenced 
by their backgrounds, communities and experiences”.105 Similarly, 
for Lady Hale, “everybody comes to th[e] task with a set of values 
and perspectives that may lead you to pick different bits of the 
materials to reason towards an outcome”.10
In effect, who a judge is cannot help but impact in some way on how 
they judge. It is for this reason that it is intrinsically flawed to have 
102 C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions’, 2005
103 E Rackley, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
104 D Pannick, ‘Judges’, Oxford University Press, 198 pp. 43-44
105 B McLachlin, ‘Why we need women judges’, International Association of Women Judges th 
Biennial Conference, Sydney, 3-7 May 2006
10 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
Guarding the guardians?
0
“the fundamental questions of law that affect us all [being] decided 
only by people whose experience of life is so very similar”.10 
Diversity of experience enriches the application and development 
of the law and should therefore be a central aspect of judicial 
appointments. In short, a diverse judiciary “is more likely to achieve 
the most just decision and the best outcome for society.”108 
The particular relevance of diversity to the senior 
judiciary
This recognition of the importance of diversity is especially relevant 
to both the Court of Appeal and, in particular, the Supreme Court, 
which hear and decide cases as a collective body: 
“The Supreme Court is a collegiate court, deciding 
arguable questions of law of general public 
importance in panels of 5,  or 9. Larger panels are 
becoming much more common. It is essential that the 
members of those panels are not, and are not seen 
to be, composed of a largely homogenous group, 
but bring a range of experience and expertise to their 
decisions.”109
Indeed, it is precisely because of the nature of the decisions involved 
that the composition of these panels is even more significant. 
The very fact that the case in question has reached the Supreme 
Court indicates that it is generally a matter where “the law is on 
a knife edge”110 and there will be, in effect, “at least two possible 
answers to the question”.111 This reality is readily apparent in the 
acknowledged fact that the actual composition of the panel itself 
can directly impact on the outcome of a case. Thus, in Lord Phillips’ 
view:
“If you sit five out of the twelve justices and you reach 
a decision 3:2, it’s fairly obvious that if you’d had a 
different five you might have reached the decision 2:3 
the other way.”112 
10 Lady Hale, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
108 Lord Justice Etherton, quoted in E Rackley, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, 
Autumn 2011
109 Lady Hale, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
110 Lord Phillips, BBC Four, ‘The Highest Court in the Land: Justice Makers’, 2011
111 Lady Hale, evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
112 BBC programme. See also B Dickinson, ‘Close calls in the House of Lords’ in J Lee (ed) From 
House of Lords to Supreme Court, 2011 and generally A Paterson, ‘Judges and the public good: 
reflections on the last Law Lords’ in A Paterson, “Lawyers and the Public Good: Democracy in 
Action”, Cambridge University Press, 2012
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 Importantly, it is in these close cases that the need for a diversity of 
experience and background is most apparent as it is precisely when 
valid legal reasoning can quite easily lead to differing conclusions 
that:
“the choice made is likely to be motivated at a far 
deeper level by the judge’s own approach to the law, 
to the problem under discussion and to ideas of what 
makes a just result’.”113
The danger of a lack of diversity of input into a collective decision-
making process leading to sub-optimal outputs is recognised in the 
social sciences. This has recently received a degree of prominence 
in the well established concept of ‘groupthink’ in relation to the 
financial crisis.114 As Alison Maitland observes:
“if you get people all from the same background and 
who have had the same experiences and are on a 
board or in a team working together, they are less 
likely to challenge each other and they are less likely 
to ask difficult questions because they are all thinking 
in the same way.”115 
This is equally applicable to a body as elevated as the Supreme 
Court, as Lady Hale recognises: “You will not get the best possible 
results if everybody comes at the same problem from exactly the 
same point of view”.11 
These conclusions are strongly supported by research on the effects 
of judicial diversity carried out largely in the US which confirm that 
the background and world-view of judges do influence cases and 
that they do so particularly in close cases in which the precise legal 
position is unclear.11 Furthermore, in relation to collegiate appellate 
courts specifically, research indicates that in cases decided by a 
panel of judges from diverse backgrounds:
113 Lady Hale, quoted in E Rackley, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 
2011
114 See for example P Thompson, Women and the New Business Leadership, Basingstoke / New 
York, 2011 and A Wittenberg-Cox and A Maitland, Why Women Mean Business, John Wiley 
and Sons Ltd., 2009
115 Katie Allen, ‘Could crash spell doom for City’s boys’ club?, The Guardian, July 2009 www.
guardian.co.uk/business/2009/jul/26/discrimination-financial-institutions-banking-women> 
(last accessed 16 March 2012). Quoted in A Horne, ‘The Changing Constitution: A Case for 
Judicial Confirmation Hearings?’, 2010
11 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011. See also in relation to this the 
Myers-Briggs psychological research on differing personality types and team-working.
11 C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions’, 2005
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1. the judges on these judicial panels were more likely to 
debate a wider range of considerations in reaching their 
judgements than were homogeneous groups of judges; 
and
2. the existence of such diversity on judicial panels was 
more likely to move the panel’s decision in the direction 
of what the law requires (i.e. the ‘quality’ of the decision-
making was actively improved).118
Similarly, Baroness Neuberger has indicated that the Advisory Panel 
on Judicial Diversity heard evidence from collective courts in other 
jurisdictions to the effect that “the diversity of the backgrounds of 
the members of their courts made a difference to the quality of their 
decision-making”.119 
In this light, the inappropriateness of the apex of the judicial branch 
of government in the UK being composed of 11 white men and 
one white woman becomes all too apparent. Rather than ‘political 
correctness’ or tokenism, diversity in fact goes to the very heart of a 
collegiate court’s ability to be fit for purpose. As the appointing body 
to the South African Constitutional Court explicitly recognises: 
“Diversity… is not an independent requirement 
superimposed on the constitutional requirement of 
competence. Properly understood, it is a ‘component 
of competence’. The court will not be competent to do 
justice unless, as a collegiate whole, it can relate fully 
to the experience of all who seek its protection”.120
 
118 ibid
119 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
120 Guidelines on questioning of candidates for members of the South African Judicial Service 
Commission.
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Case study: Radmacher v Granatino (2010)
Some of these issues concerning the composition of 
the Supreme Court came to the fore in the recent case 
Radmacher v Granatino in which the Justices were asked 
to determine how much weight should be granted to a 
pre-nuptial agreement in divorce proceedings. In English 
law, ‘pre-nups’ have never been considered legally binding. 
However, in this landmark judgement, the court held that 
– in the right case – such agreements can have decisive or 
compelling weight.
The court heard the case as a panel of nine. It reached its 
decision to accord weight to the pre-nuptial agreement by a 
majority of eight to one. In the majority were the eight male 
Justices; in the minority was the one female Justice.
Pre-nuptial agreements are generally condemned in 
mainstream feminist thinking as discriminatory and 
potentially oppressive against women:
“A pre-nuptial agreement is designed to take 
away...equality [before the law], to deprive the less 
powerful party to the marriage of what she – and it 
is usually she – would otherwise be entitled to.”121 
In this context therefore, as Lady Hale adds, it is “striking 
that all the men thought one thing and I thought something 
else”122:
“There is a gender dimension to the issue that 
some may think ill-suited the decision by a court 
consisting of eight men and one woman.”123
It is important not to be reductive here. It is not 
being suggested that the gender of the Justices was 
straightforwardly deterministic in reaching their decision. 
However, it must be recognised that different experiences 
and perspectives should have – and should be seen to have 
– a significant role in the delivery of justice by a collegiate 
court that adjudicates on behalf of society as a whole.124 
121 Lady Hale, BBC Four, ‘The Highest Court in the Land: Justice Makers’, 2011
122 BBC Four, ‘The Highest Court in the Land: Justice Makers’, 2011
123 Interview in the Times, 15 October 2011
124 See also Hale’s comment, having been out-voted 4:1 on another case (McDonald), 
that it could be that the “physical differences between men and women lead 
them to have different views of what dignity means in this context. So it is not 
surprising that women take a different view”. The Times, 15 October 2011.
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4 – ‘Merit’ and diversity in senior judicial 
appointments
“Not qualified, the best. Surely it is not sufficient just to 
say X passes muster. You must appoint the best.”125
 Lord Irvine
“The problem with this whole debate is the assumption 
that we know what merit is.”12
Lord Goldsmith
The roadblock to a diverse judiciary: the exaltation 
of individual ‘merit’ 
The key to understanding how such a situation can persist lies in the 
difficult interaction between diversity and the concept of ‘merit’ in 
judicial appointments. For senior judicial posts, the statute requires 
the respective ad hoc appointing commissions to select candidates 
strictly ‘on merit’, without any explanation or guidance as to what 
this actually means.12 As Lord Bingham puts it, “the term is not 
self-defining”.128
Indeed, for Bingham, the concept explicitly “enables account to be 
taken of wider considerations, including the virtue of gender and 
ethnic diversity” as components of ‘merit’.129 However, there is a very 
real sense that, within the judiciary and the legal profession itself, 
a particular – quite different – understanding of what constitutes 
individualised merit has come to be treated as a somehow objective 
and tangible absolute that must effectively trump everything. It is 
this understanding that has, as a result, come to hold full sway in 
judicial appointments. 
125 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
12 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
12 Section 2 (5) CRA 2005
128 Lord Bingham, “The Law Lords: who has served” in L Blom-Cooper, B Dickson and G Drewry 
(eds), ‘The Judicial House of Lords 18-2009’, 2009 p12
129 Ibid
:
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This concept can be seen emerging time and again in discussion 
before the Constitution Committee, as with Lord Irvine’s comment 
above. Similarly, the submission by the judiciary to the CRA 2005 
consultation process warns of “becoming so anxious to achieve 
diversity that sight is lost of the primacy of merit”, stressing that 
“the justice system will be debased if the very best candidates are 
not appointed” [emphasis added].130 Diversity and merit are – in this 
conception – unrelated, perhaps even antithetical. 
As Lord Falconer identifies, this relentless focus on the fine 
gradations of (a particular conception of) individualised merit stems 
in large part from a peculiar trait of the legal profession itself:
“One of the things that really drives lawyers and judges 
is the sense of a sort of league table of brilliance... 
There is the most brilliant lawyer, who is number one, 
and then number two is the next most brilliant, and it 
is all league tables. No other profession regards merit 
in this top-10 sort of way.”131
The problem with this, as Lord Goldsmith identifies, is the latent 
assumption that merit is a ‘given’ – that we know instinctively ‘what 
it is’. What does ‘the best’ actually mean?
As Kate Malleson has very clearly shown, ‘merit’ in the context of 
judicial appointments is never an objective absolute and is always 
a subjective and varying cultural construction based entirely on 
the perceived qualities required for the position and the pool of 
available candidates.132 Or, as Beverley McLachlin puts it: “merit is 
in the eye of the beholder”.133
Historically, what has been ‘put in’ to the definition of ‘merit’ for 
judicial appointments has constantly shifted. In Lord Halsbury’s 
day, it apparently included coming from the same party as the Lord 
Chancellor. At a later point, it was deemed to be a good thing to have 
had previous political experience before appointment as a judge in 
the House of Lords. More recently, however, it has been – and in 
large part still is - the case that: “Merit is regarded as coterminous 
with having been a junior and a QC at the Bar for 30 years”.134 The 
130 Lord Irvine quoted in R Stevens, ‘Reform in haste and repent at leisure: lolanthe, the Lord High 
Executioner and Brave New World’, Legal Studies, Volume 24, Issue 1-2, pp. 1-34, 2003
131 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
132 K Malleson, ‘Rethinking the merit principle in judicial selection’, Journal of Law and Society, 
Volume 33, Issue 1, March 2006. This is not to say that appointing commissions do not strive 
to identify objective evidence in relation to the particular construction of merit in question.
133 Quoted in R Stevens, ‘Reform in haste and repent at leisure’, Legal Studies, 2003
134 Lord Falconer, evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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more outstanding an individual is at this, the more they ‘deserve’ to 
be a judge. Tellingly, ‘the Bar’ represents only around 10 per cent of 
the legal profession in the UK and, partly through inherent structural 
issues, is highly unbalanced at senior levels in terms of gender and 
ethnicity. It is worth reiterating that this approach stands in marked 
contrast to senior courts in other jurisdictions which draw their 
members from a far wider range of career backgrounds.135 
The result is a danger that ‘merit’ has also therefore become linked 
– entirely subconsciously – to being white and male:
“One almost inevitable effect of selecting judges from a 
narrow group is that the characteristics of that group 
tend to become synonymous with merit.”13
Thus, as the Master of the Rolls puts it:
“The main problem is the cast of mind. Most of us think 
of a judge as a white, probably public school, man. We 
have all got that problem.”13 
This danger of cloning is compounded by the very structure of 
the appointments process itself in which, as outlined above, the 
(almost exclusively white and male) senior judiciary are playing 
a predominating role in the appointment of their colleagues. As 
McLachlin emphasises:
“Psychologists tell us that human beings have a 
tendency to see merit only in those who exhibit the 
same qualities that they possess. Senior lawyers are 
no exception. So when they look for merit, they tend 
to look for someone like themselves.”138 
Or, as Lord McNally puts it:
“I have only one problem about the merit criterion. It is 
often deployed by people who, when you scratch the 
surface, are really talking about “chaps like us”. That 
is the danger of merit. Who defines it?”139
135 K Malleson, ‘Appointments to the House of Lords: who goes upstairs’ in in L Blom-Cooper, B 
Dickson and G Drewry (eds), “The Judicial House of Lords 18-2009”, 2009. 
13 K Malleson, ‘The New Judicial Appointments in England and Wales: New Wine in New 
Bottles?’ in K Malleson and P Russell (eds.), “Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: 
Critical Perspectives from around the world”, University of Toronto Press, 200, pp. 39-55
13 Lord Neuberger, evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
138 B McLachlin ‘Why we need women judges’, International Association of Women Judges th 
Biennial Conference, Sydney, 3-7 May 2006
139 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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Breaking down the prevailing (and exalted) conception of individual 
‘merit’ and recognising that it is simply one culturally specific 
construction is therefore crucial in clearing the roadblock towards 
a more diverse judiciary.140 Properly recognised, ‘merit’ in judicial 
appointments is simply a construct of what we – as a collective 
society – consider is necessary and desirable for the judiciary in the 
21st century. 
The need to reconsider the prevailing conception of 
merit 
The limitations of the section 159 ‘tie-break’
The main proposal for increasing judicial diversity contained in the 
Ministry of Justice consultation is the possible introduction of the 
section 159 Equality Act ‘tie breaker’ provision (as endorsed by Lord 
Neuberger and others). With this, when two candidates are deemed 
to be of equal merit and one of these candidates is from an under-
represented group, that candidate can be given priority. 
However, partly because the prevailing conception of ‘merit’ in 
judicial appointments is so imbued with a deep sensitivity to fine 
gradations in perceived individual qualities of a particular nature 
– ‘the top ten’ mind-set - such a change would have a very limited 
impact (particularly at a senior level). As Lord Phillips, the Chair of 
every Supreme Court selection commission puts it:
“The idea that you have to have exact equality is not 
going to be realistic... it is impossible to say that two 
people are absolutely on a level pegging; it would be 
very, very difficult.”141
The Constitution Committee has heard extensive evidence of a 
similar opinion, not least from the Lord Chief Justice and the Chair 
of the JAC of England and Wales, Christopher Stephens.142 Indeed, 
as Erika Rackley points out, this JAC has, since the introduction of 
the new appointments procedures under CRA 2005, always been 
able to distinguish between candidates.143 As such, the proposal 
140 To see how far from an objective absolute it is even in current application it is only necessary 
to look at the significant fluctuations in recent contests over the wisdom or even ‘legitimacy’ of 
appointments direct from private practice.
141 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
142 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011. In fairness, however, there are 
differing schools of thought on this point. Some have argued that ‘equal’ if viewed in the 
light of EU jurisprudence should be given the rather broader interpretation of ‘substantially 
equivalent merit’.
143 E Rackley, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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runs the risk of marking merely another positive headline backed 
up by very little positive impact in terms of addressing the glaring 
diversity deficit. 
Relating merit to the needs of the collective institution
What is instead required is a more fundamental reconsideration 
of the manner in which ‘merit’ is determined in relation to judicial 
appointments, particularly at a senior level. The relentless focus on 
one (flawed) construction of perceived individual merit must move 
towards a process in which the needs of the judiciary as a collective 
institution are central. It is in relation to this that the consideration of 
the constitutional rationale for a diverse judiciary becomes crucial. 
Both the normative ground of enhanced legitimacy and the more 
substantive aspect of enhanced competence in the delivery of 
justice are of course highly relevant to the judiciary as a whole. 
However, they are particularly and pressingly so in relation to the 
senior judiciary. As emphasised above, the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeal are collegiate courts that make binding legal 
(and increasingly, ‘small p political’) decisions as a collective. The 
competence of these courts is therefore a corporate competence, 
not simply an aggregation of the individual competences of their 
individual members. This collective competence – the institutional 
‘merit’ of such a court – must therefore play a much more central 
role in the process of appointments to it. 
Indeed, a relentlessly individualised concept of merit is entirely 
inappropriate for such a court. In a company, team or collective 
organisation of any kind it would seem highly unusual to focus 
exclusively on the individual abilities of a potential member 
without any consideration of their impact on the collective whole. 
In a rough sense, it would be akin to a football manager repeatedly 
signing high-scoring centre-forwards without any view to the wider 
needs of his side. Yet this is, in large part, the approach adopted 
in relation to the corporate body that is the ultimate arbiter of law 
in the UK.
There is, however, an exception to this. In assessing the merits of 
prospective candidates, the appointing commission is required to 
ensure “that between them the Judges will have knowledge of, 
and experience of practice in, the law of each part of the United 
Kingdom”.144 This requirement is designed to ensure that there is 
continued representation from both Scotland and Northern Ireland 
144 Section 2 (8) CRA 2005
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on the Supreme Court (the absence of which would be, according 
to Lord Mackay, “terrifically damaging”145).14 
To explicitly recognise the impact of geographical representation 
on institutional ‘merit’ and yet to ignore this idea of collective 
competence completely in relation to everything else is 
fundamentally flawed. If, for example, as Lord Phillips suggests, 
“public law now occupies about half of the time of the Supreme 
Court”14, would it not be logical to be able to expressly take into 
account the court’s obvious need for a significant degree of public 
law expertise when making appointments? Would the competence 
of the court not be greatly weakened if it was composed of members 
who – although the 12 most ‘brilliant minds’ by one very specific 
understanding of individual merit – were all lacking in public law 
experience? Yet, according to the prevailing interpretation outlined 
by Phillips himself:
“The Act does not permit or provide that the appointing 
commission should have regard to the composition of 
the court and any gaps of specialities on the court.”148
As outlined in detail above, another significant aspect of the 
competence of such a court is the ability to relate to the experiences 
of the society it serves and to bring the range of perspectives that 
accompany these experiences into the collective decision making 
process. As such, a court composed of 11 white men and one white 
woman is running a similar risk of undermining its capacity to fully 
deliver – and be perceived to deliver – justice in a diverse, mature 
democratic society. 
This does not mean that it would be desirable to appoint people 
unable or unqualified to fulfil the role just to redress the imbalance. 
This would very obviously not be what the court needs as a collective 
whole. Collective competence will inevitably require a very high 
degree of individual ability from each of the judges. However, can 
it really be the case that such ability is the exclusive preserve of, 
essentially, one section of our society? 
What it does mean, is that the common conception of diversity as 
145 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
14 In the Canadian Supreme Court there is a convention that three of its members should come 
from Quebec, three from Ontario and the remaining three from other provinces, since it is felt 
to enhance the legitimacy of the court. The convention is rooted not simply in a desire to cater 
for Quebec’s civilian legal tradition but also to reflect the diversity of experience in different 
parts of the country in a way that will enhance the public’s sense of ownership of the Court. 
Interview with Beverley McLachlin, ABC Radio National 13/9/11.
14 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
148 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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entirely separate to and indeed, at times, directly oppositional to 
‘merit’ falls away. By recognising that the needs of a collective body 
must be central when making appointments to that body, it becomes 
clear that diversity and merit are directly aligned and, indeed, 
inextricably linked. If the collective competence of the Supreme 
Court would be increased by the appointment of a fully qualified 
member from an under-represented (or indeed un-represented) 
group, then, properly understood, diversity in fact becomes an 
integral aspect of merit.
However, as Lord Falconer notes, the ‘top-ten mentality’ is difficult 
to shake. One result of this is evident in the attempt to argue that 
diversity should be increased by a move to what is sometimes called 
an ‘above and below the line’ concept of merit. The idea here is that 
a candidate from an under-represented group should be appointed 
if they reach a minimum level of qualification at the explicit expense 
of ‘establishment’ candidates who are ‘better’ than them. This leads 
– entirely understandably – to concerns over tokenism:
“People want to know that they have been appointed 
on merit and merit alone and they want to walk tall, 
knowing that that is the basis on which they have 
been chosen.”149 
This is only the case, however, precisely because the ‘above and 
below the line’ argument is an (entirely understandable) attempt 
to shoehorn the collective need for diversity into the straight-jacket 
that is the prevailing construction of individual merit. Importantly, it 
is this very construct that is itself imbued with the latent assumption 
that a judge is ‘a white, probably public school, man’.
As such, the alternative explicit recognition of the importance of 
institutional merit as a factor in the appointments process is the 
precise opposite of tokenism. It is the recognition of the pressing 
need of the collective institution (particularly the senior collegiate 
courts but also the judiciary as a whole) to correct the damaging 
imbalance created by the very assumption that Lord Neuberger 
identifies. 
The understanding of merit for appointments to the Supreme Court 
(and also the Court of Appeal) should therefore be altered to reflect 
the need to give primacy to the collective competence of the court 
(in accordance with a new statutory test as outlined in Chapter ). 
With this, a person will – importantly - only be appointed when they 
149 Christopher Stephens, evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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are the best candidate. They will be the best candidate because they 
best reflect what would be most beneficial to the court (and, as a 
direct result, the society it serves). Surely this is what ‘merit’ in this 
context should actually mean? 
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5 – Lessons from an international 
perspective
“Other countries, whose commitment to judicial 
independence cannot be doubted, have in place 
mechanisms for achieving some degree of routine 
accountability for judicial power.”150
 Professor Andrew Le Sueur
“I do not think that it is acceptable to have a Supreme 
Court that has Baroness Hale as the only woman on 
it and no one from a visible ethnic minority. We are 
shamed by a picture of our Supreme Court when 
placed against the [international] equivalents.”151
Roger Smith
Director of JUSTICE
The increased constitutional and political salience of judicial 
appointments is an issue that is far from unique to the UK. In their 
multi-jurisdictional comparative study, Malleson and Russell chart 
the global expansion of the judicial role, identifying the process of 
judicialisation that has led to a current international ‘age of judicial 
power’.152 At the core of this trend is the fact that, increasingly, 
“judges in top review courts are reaching decisions that often have 
far-reaching social and political implications”.153 This expansion of 
judicial power has, unsurprisingly, been mirrored by an increased 
focus on the process of judicial appointments which has given rise 
to substantive reforms in many countries.
In reviewing the role of the judiciary and the mechanisms for 
their appointment in the 19 jurisdictions covered by the study, 
150 A Le Sueur, ‘Developing mechanisms for judicial accountability in the UK’, Legal Studies, 
Volume 24, Issue 1-2, 2004
151 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
152 K Malleson and P Russell (eds.), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical 
Perspectives from around the world, University of Toronto Press, 200
153 Ibid; Introduction
:
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Malleson identifies two overarching international themes. The 
first is the resulting pressure to rethink the balance between 
judicial independence and accountability in judicial appointments 
processes. The second is the growing recognition of the importance 
of selecting more diverse judiciaries.154 
What becomes very clear from a comparative analysis is that 
– in relation to both of these core themes – the UK is in danger of 
being left behind. Where other countries have moved to introduce 
accountability mechanisms to the appointment process for their 
most senior judges, the procedure under CRA 2005 is “the least 
accountable” in the common law world, with “no elected politicians 
in its membership and no devices to enhance accountability”.155 
Similarly, the potential consequences of the glaring diversity deficit 
identified by Smith above (outlined in detail at figure ) have been 
explicitly recognised by Lady Justice Arden:
“There is a real possibility that the continued failure of 
the system to increase judicial diversity will weaken our 
international standing among the leading judiciaries 
of the world, which now have significant numbers of 
women judges at the higher levels and in leadership 
positions.”15 
International lessons on accountability 
The US model: the elephant in the courtroom
Unquestionably the most famous (or infamous) example of an 
accountability measure in relation to judicial appointments is the 
process of Senate confirmation hearings for appointments to the 
US Supreme Court. However, in a debate that is otherwise generally 
characterised by its nuanced sophistication, there is a marked 
tendency in the UK to reductively conflate any consideration of an 
increase in accountability in judicial appointments with this process 
(and its perceived flaws). Time and again, the spectre of ‘what 
happens in America’ is raised almost as if this, in and of itself, is 
enough to effectively rebut the whole argument for the need for 
greater accountability in relation to senior judicial posts.
Thus, for Lord Neuberger, the suggestion of any involvement of 
elected politicians in the appointments process is met with the 
154 Ibid; Introduction
155 Ibid; Conclusion
15 Lady Justice Arden, written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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response that: 
“Once you start muddying the water and involving 
the legislature in the appointment of judges, you risk 
going down a slippery slope, not quite knowing where 
it will end. The last thing that we want is the sort of 
thing you see in the United States.”15
For Lord Kerr, the suggestion elicits a very similar response:
“I would regard that as a most unwelcome...It is 
widely acknowledged, for instance, among many 
commentators that the system of confirmation 
hearings in America is a most unhappy one.”158
Again, for Baroness Prashar:
“I think to put selected candidates before parliamentary 
scrutiny—well, we know what happens in America. It 
will be a toxic mixture.”159
Despite a lack of consensus as to why it is deemed such an 
undesirable parallel – consistently attacked both for being 
invasive of a candidate’s privacy (largely a myth based on two 
particular hearings) and yet also for being so anodyne as to be 
‘redundant’ (another myth)10 – this American ‘bogeyman’ looms 
disproportionately large over the whole debate. However, it is in 
fact an almost entirely inappropriate point of comparison.11 
US Supreme Court judges are chosen directly by the President - an 
explicit and hugely significant act of political patronage operating 
at the highest level, frequently driven by ideological considerations. 
It is this that leads to the basic constitutional necessity that the 
Senate hearings scrutinising such appointments are themselves 
politicised: they are an important check on an overtly political (or, 
more accurately, ‘Political with a large P’) act. To attempt therefore 
to divorce this process from its very specific constitutional and 
political context and apply lessons derived from it to a markedly 
different system of judicial appointments is misconceived. Instead, 
15 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
158 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011 
159 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
10 The wealth of material produced to the Senate Judiciary Committee and the wider world on 
candidates and their track record far outstrips what is available to the UK public about any 
appointees to our Supreme Court.
11 There also appears to be very little recognition or consideration of the fact that pre-appointment 
parliamentary hearings are now successfully held in relation to a large number of senior public 
office positions in the UK.
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as Graham Gee points out:
“The critical point is that hearings do not, in and 
of themselves, ‘politicize’ judicial appointments. 
It follows that little weight should be attached to 
arguments in UK debates that appeal to hearings 
for the US Supreme Court as evidence that scrutiny 
hearings necessarily ‘politicize’ appointments.”12 
[emphasis added]
If a mature debate is to be had about the need to enhance judicial 
accountability without undermining judicial independence, the 
deeply reductive tendency to effectively equate the former with 
‘what happens in America’ must be eschewed in favour of a more 
considered and broadly informed discussion. 
Canada: the use of post-nomination, introductory 
parliamentary hearings
At around the same time as the reforms under CRA 2005 were 
being considered in the UK, Canada was also grappling with the 
issue of the appropriate appointments process for its highest 
court. Faced with a similar expansion of judicial power vis-a-vis 
the other branches of government, it was recognised that reform 
was necessary to enhance judicial accountability while also 
protecting judicial independence by lessening the scope of political 
patronage.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the obvious starting points in the 
discussion was again the model provided by its near neighbour. 
Thus, while considering what process should be adopted, the 
Canadian Bar Association noted that:
“ the U.S. style confirmation process draws the harshest 
criticism in Canada. At confirmation hearings in the 
U.S., potential judicial candidates can be subject to an 
“intensive grilling” by the Senate Judiciary Committee 
concerning their views on current social and political 
questions. The Senators’ prying into the candidates’ 
private lives can amount to a virtual inquisition, 
especially if the political complexion of the committee 
differs from that of the candidate.”13
12 Written evidence to Constitution Committee
13 Canadian Bar Association, ‘Supreme Court of Canada Appointment Process’, www.cba.org/
cba/submissions/pdf/04-10-03-eng.pdf, March 2004 (last accessed 16 March 2012)
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However, rather than treating this as somehow an end to the matter, 
the specific constitutional and political context of US hearings was 
recognised and an attempt to learn from this was made. The result is 
that for the appointment of Justice Rothstein in 200 and the recent 
appointments of Justices Moldaver and Karakatsanis in 2011, a very 
different form of Parliamentary hearing has been used in Canada 
and may now be considered part of the constitutional framework 
for appointments to their Supreme Court.
In Canada, a shortlist of three nominees for each Supreme 
Court vacancy is selected by an ad hoc appointing commission 
(comprising members from all the major political parties) and 
provided to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice, who will 
then select and appoint a single nominee from this list. It is only 
after the nominee for any vacancy has been selected by the Prime 
Minister that the Parliamentary hearing will take place. Thus, while 
the Prime Minister may conceivably choose to take into account 
what happens at this hearing before confirming the appointment, it 
is his or her decision that is fully binding. In effect, therefore, the role 
of the Parliamentary hearing is not to actually alter the nomination 
itself (there is no formal recommendation or confirmation process) 
but instead:
“is intended to bring greater openness and transparency 
to the appointments process by allowing Canadians 
to learn more about those individuals who will be 
appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada.”14 
Importantly, the hearings take place following clear guidance as 
to what questions are appropriate (and inappropriate) to ask of a 
Supreme Court nominee in specific light of the need to preserve 
judicial independence. The hearings begin with an introductory 
statement from a constitutional expert outlining the purpose of 
the process and the necessary restrictions on judicial speech. In 
particular, it is emphasised that the nominees will not be able to 
answer questions relating to how they might resolve a hypothetical 
case or what their position is in relation to a specific sensitive issue 
that may in future arise before them in court. 
Beyond this, the members of the ad hoc Parliamentary committee 
(composed of MPs – often those possessing significant legal 
experience – drawn from the respective parties in accordance with 
their electoral standing) are free to ask a wide range of questions. 
Topics have included extensive discussions of a nominee’s career 
14 Transcript of 2011 hearing: www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ja-nj/2011/doc_325.html 
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background and experience and the qualities that qualify them 
for the job, the judicial function generally and the specific role of 
a Supreme Court Justice, a candidate’s broad judicial philosophy 
and their ideas on legitimate legal reasoning, the role of the judicial 
branch in relation to the other limbs of state and the perceived ideal 
characteristics of a Supreme Court judge. 
The general consensus is that these hearings have been highly 
successful.15 Even a brief scrutiny of the transcripts1 of these 
hearings shows that – while no doubt still challenging for the 
nominees – they have been carried out with the utmost “civility and 
moderation”.1 The guidance on appropriate judicial speech has 
been universally respected and on the few occasions that policy 
issues did arise (in relation to inner city crime rates for example), 
the nominee straightforwardly (and entirely uncontroversially) 
indicated that this was a political issue on which it would not be 
appropriate for them to comment. 
The rationale for the use of public (televised) hearings therefore is 
not to attack or interrogate the nominee from a politically motivated 
stand-point, not least because the committee involved has no power 
to block the appointment. Instead, the basis “is really the democratic 
notion that important decisions should be transparent”.18 Thus, as 
the newly appointed Justice Karakatsanis puts it herself:
“I would not be entirely honest if I did not admit to 
some considerable nervousness about this hearing. 
However, while it may be somewhat nerve-racking for 
the nominee, this hearing provides some transparency 
to the process, and it is a real opportunity for elected 
officials and the Canadian public to meet the nominees 
for these important positions.”19
The Canadian example thus provides clear evidence that, 
leaving the long shadow cast by the US model behind, public 
hearings – if handled well – “do not automatically undermine 
judicial independence, invade candidates’ privacy, or deter good 
15 See for example K Malleson, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of Supreme Court nominees: a view from 
the United Kingdom’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Volume 44, Issue 3, 200
1 www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ja-nj/2011/doc_325.html 
1 Professor Hogg, constitutional adviser to Canadian Supreme Court, in 2011 hearing 
transcript
18 P Hogg, ‘Appointment of Thomas A. Cromwell to the Supreme Court of Canada’, Institute of 
Intergovernmental Relations School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University, SC Working Paper, 
May 2009 
19 2011 hearing transcript
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candidates from applying”.10 The result is that the Canadian public 
are in a position to have a far greater knowledge of those wielding 
very significant public power (and how it is they come to hold that 
power) than their equivalents in the UK. 
Israel and South Africa: parliamentary input on Supreme 
Court nominating panels
An alternative model pursued in other liberal democracies is that in 
which “accountability is primarily pursued through the composition 
of the institution charged with judicial selection”.11 Thus, in both 
Israel and South Africa, the commission that selects the nominees 
for the relevant Supreme Court is composed of a combination of 
parliamentarians (from opposing political parties), judges and other 
legal professionals. 
The specific balance between the different members varies. In 
Israel, all three branches of government and the legal profession 
are represented on the nine member committee: in total there are 
four politicians, three Supreme Court judges and two practising 
lawyers (elected by the Council of the Bar). In South Africa, a larger 
panel (consisting of 23 members) is also composed of senior 
judges, members of the legal profession and – reflecting the unique 
political context – a larger number of political members (11) drawn 
from across the political spectrum.12 
The key point, however, is that by combining parliamentarians 
and senior judicial / legal figures on the selection committee, this 
“preclud[es] its decision-making powers from being the exclusive 
domain of either political or professional interests”.13 The make-up 
of the committee itself is intended to strike a balance that enhances 
judicial accountability without compromising judicial independence. 
Furthermore, as François du Bois indicates with specific reference 
to South Africa:
“ensuring that appointments are the product of collective 
10 K Malleson, ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of Supreme Court nominees: a view from the United 
Kingdom’, Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Volume 44, Issue 3, 200
11 F Du Bois, ‘Judicial selection in post-Apartheid South Africa’, in K Malleson and P Russell eds., 
“Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the world”, 
University of Toronto Press, 200 
12 While recognising the specific cultural context, recent experience might suggest that this large 
a number and proportion of politicians is perhaps in danger of tipping the balance too far, 
risking the danger of politicising appointments. This provides further evidence that striking an 
appropriate balance on such a commission is crucial, as developed in Chapter .  
13 F Du Bois, ‘Judicial selection in post-Apartheid South Africa’, in K Malleson and P Russell eds., 
‘Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the world’, 
University of Toronto Press, 200 
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decision making involving all major interested parties 
fosters debate among them on the murky conception 
of judicial merit, and may limit potentially destructive 
public disagreements between politicians and the 
legal establishment.”14
It is therefore apparent that, in the context of enhanced judicial 
power, the involvement of parliamentarians in an active role in 
the appointments process does not – if appropriately constructed 
– necessarily represent a threat to judicial independence and can 
be important in striking an appropriate balance with that other 
vital touchstone, judicial accountability. As Lord Justice Etherton 
notes the Canadian, South African and Israeli examples outlined 
above are of particular relevance “because they are examples of 
vibrant democracies and independent judiciaries that confront, 
when it is necessary, Parliament, the relevant legislature and the 
executive.”15 These independent judiciaries are able to perform 
precisely this crucial role in part because their authority and 
legitimacy are buttressed by an appointments process that places 
the public power they wield on a sufficiently firm, democratically 
acceptable footing. 
Thus, as Russell identifies:
“The one clear conclusion to be taken from the 
[international] accounts of appointing judges...is that 
no matter how the process is constructed it always 
has a political dimension....In this age of judicial 
power, with judges playing such a prominent role 
in governance, [complete] independence from a 
country’s politics is neither possible nor desirable.”1
International lessons on diversity 
Political will and a reconsideration of merit
In terms of diversity, the essential lesson to be gleaned from other 
jurisdictions is that, in creating a more representative judiciary, 
political will and leadership are key. This is perhaps most obvious 
in the South African example outlined above, where the heavy 
14 ibid
15 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
1 P Russell, ‘Conclusion’ in K Malleson and P Russell (eds.), “Appointing Judges in an Age of 
Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the world”, University of Toronto Press, 
200 
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cross-party political influence is specifically designed to ensure 
diversity in a context where it is a particularly pressing element of 
collective competence. Similarly, in Israel, from “the early days of 
the [appointing] committee’s work it was the politicians who pushed 
for a more representative [Supreme] Court”:
“The bottom line, therefore, is that, mainly due to 
the politicians’ input in the selection process, in 
comparison to other countries, the composition of the 
courts in Israel, including the highest court, has always 
been more heterogeneous from the perspective of 
ethnic origins, gender, and religious beliefs.”1
Similarly, the key to enhancing judicial diversity at the federal level 
in the US has been exerted, pro-active efforts by the executive from 
the late 190s onwards, particularly under presidents Carter and 
Clinton.18 The evidence of this political impact has been even more 
striking in Canada where judicial make-up has been effectively 
transformed since the 1980s, primarily as a result of “various 
initiatives on the part of the federal Minister of Justice”.19 Thus, as 
Cheryl Thomas outlines in her comprehensive comparative analysis 
of judicial diversity: 
“The direct involvement of senior political leaders 
in championing the appointment of women and 
minorities to the bench in both the United States and 
Canada indicate this is a key element of a successful 
judicial diversity policy, perhaps especially in common 
law countries.”180
At the core of each of these politically driven judicial diversification 
processes has been a reassessment (again politically driven) of what 
‘merit’ means and where it resides. As outlined above, ‘merit’ is 
always a construct based on the prevailing conceptions of the most 
suitable attributes for a position and the deemed pool of potential 
candidates. The reassessment of merit in the context of enhancing 
judicial diversity generally therefore involves two interrelated 
processes. 
1 E Salzberger, ‘Judicial appointments and promotions in Israel: constitution, law and politics”, 
in K Malleson and P Russell (eds.), “Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: critical 
perspectives from around the world”, University of Toronto Press, 200 
18 C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions: A review of 
research, policies, and practices’, The Commission for Judicial Appointments, November 
2005
19 ibid
180 ibid
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The first is a recognition of the importance of diversity to the 
collective or institutional merit of the relevant judiciary as a whole 
and the highest (collegiate) court specifically as a result of the 
impact on legitimacy in a mature democratic society. The second is 
the recognition that the prevailing conception of individual merit is 
not an objective absolute but seriously flawed and exclusionary in 
and of itself. Thus:
“The evidence from countries such as Canada which 
have achieved more success in diversifying their 
judiciaries is that both the cause and effect of their 
diversification has been the widening of the definition 
of merit beyond the profile of existing members of the 
judiciary.”181
As Beverley McLachlin identifies when discussing how change was 
brought about in Canada: “It seems...wrong to permit a limited 
sector of the profession to exclusively define excellence.”182 
However, precisely because of the cloning dangers MaLachlin also 
identifies (the tendency for senior lawyers to ‘look for someone like 
themselves’), an external – that is political – impetus is required 
in order to alter this prevailing conception. It will not, almost by 
definition, come organically from within a body that is able to be 
largely self-perpetuating. 
Thus, in Canada, the Minister of Justice announced a new judicial 
appointments process which expressly recognised that “the 
judiciary should represent a broad cross-section of Canadian 
Society. To achieve this, the appointment of women and individuals 
from cultural and ethnic minorities should be encouraged”.183 What 
has followed has been a pro-active policy of increasing diversity at 
both the federal and provincial court levels.184 At the core of this has 
been a willingness to recognise ‘merit’ in candidates from alternative 
backgrounds to what McLachlin describes as “the traditional 
practice and profile – male, silk, an all-round decent chap”:
“In Canada, we have been doing these things for 20 years 
or more, and there is no sense that merit has suffered 
181 K Malleson, ‘The new judicial appointments commission in England and Wales’, in K Malleson 
and P Russell (eds.), “Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: critical perspectives 
from around the world”, University of Toronto Press, 200
182 B McLachlin, ‘Why we need women judges’, International Association of Women Judges th 
Biennial Conference, Sydney, 3-7 May, 2006
183 Canadian Minister of Justice quoted in C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom 
and other jurisdictions’, 2005
184 C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions’, 2005
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or that the bench has declined in quality. The picture 
is of a mix of bright, dedicated and experienced men 
and women of varying ages and backgrounds working 
together to dispense justice as competently, fairly and 
courteously as they can. Applying the merit principle 
in this manner requires conscious efforts on the part 
of both governments and the legal profession.”185
The role and composition of the nominating commission 
itself
Another aspect of the process of enhancing judicial diversity in 
Canada and the United States has been the significant energies 
devoted by the relevant nominating commissions themselves (at 
various levels) to outreach programmes. These programmes are 
specifically designed to encourage applications from members 
of under-represented groups, both generally and in relation 
to targeted individual candidates. This allows the nominating 
commissions in these jurisdictions to retain some of the benefits 
of the traditional ‘tap on the shoulder’ mechanism, while avoiding 
its inherent inequalities by ensuring that encouragement to apply is 
always followed by a standardised, rigorous evaluation procedure. 
As such, “these jurisdictions consider active recruitment to be an 
essential aspect of the work of the commission”.18 As a result, the 
commissions themselves are able to pursue a joined-up, long-term 
HR policy (as opposed to always relying on an ad hoc snapshot) 
that is beneficial to increasing judicial diversity.
The composition of the nominating commission itself in terms of 
its own reflectiveness of society is also an important point that 
has been pursued in other jurisdictions (again, notably, in Canada 
and the US). By encouraging and at times mandating a loosely 
representative mix on the selection body itself, the potential 
negative impact of the psychological tendency to recruit in one’s 
own image (as identified by Mclachlin) is largely negated. This is 
also supported by empirical research from America indicating 
that “diverse commissions attracted more diverse applicants and 
selected more diverse nominees for appointment”.18 
185 B McLachlin, ‘Why we need women judges’, International Association of Women Judges th 
Biennial Conference, Sydney, May 2006
18 C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions’, 2005
18 ibid
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The failure to ‘trickle-up’
Another important lesson – this time drawn particularly from 
a number of European jurisdictions – is the existence of a well 
established ‘prestige’ effect whereby women and ethnic minorities 
are most likely to attain judicial office in less prestigious courts.188 
This effect is in evidence in the UK where, although there has been 
some limited progress at lower levels, this has clearly not been the 
case for the senior judiciary. As Baroness Neuberger puts it:
“if you talk to them [the minority judges in the lower 
courts] privately they will all talk about being below 
the salt. They feel as if they are a junior branch where 
it is okay to be diverse and people make appointments 
in a different way, but that does not apply further 
up.”189
However, the existence of this effect is even more striking in 
jurisdictions that have made far greater progress towards diversity 
at lower levels. As Thomas outlines, in the Netherlands, France, 
Italy, Spain and Germany – all countries where women have had 
substantial success in gaining appointment to the judiciary – this 
early success does not translate to progress into senior posts. 
Thus, even where there is something approaching parity at the 
lower levels of a judiciary, this does not – if left to itself – lead to the 
desired ‘trickle up’ of diversity into senior posts: instead, in these 
jurisdictions, “every step up the judicial ladder took more time for 
women than for men”.190
Notably, however, this prestige effect does not operate in Canada or 
the United States, where women and minorities are as (and possibly 
more) likely to become judges on higher courts as they are on lower 
courts.191 This emphasises again the importance of political will and 
leadership in these contexts and that it must operate specifically 
at the level of the senior judiciary if a diversification of that senior 
judiciary is to be brought about. An appointments system that 
removes all substantive political input is therefore problematic not 
only from an accountability perspective, but also because it removes 
the single most effective lever for promoting diversity. 
188 Ibid 
189 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
190 C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions’, 2005
191 ibid
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6 – Addressing the democratic deficit
 
“This is an issue that concerns all of us in this society 
as a whole. It cannot be left just to the professions to 
ensure that we have an appropriate judiciary, fit for 
the 21st century.”192
 Nwabueze Nwokolo
 Chair of Black Solicitors Network
The preceding chapters have demonstrated the constitutional and 
societal importance of an appropriate system of senior judicial 
appointments that is able to provide a fully legitimate basis for 
the important expanded judicial role in the new constitutional 
settlement. The key to achieving such a system lies in a sensitive 
rebalancing of the weight attached to the key touchstones of 
independence, accountability and diversity. This chapter will seek 
to address the relationship between the first two and the following 
chapter will focus on the latter. 
An expanded, permanent senior judiciary JAC with 
minority parliamentary representation
As outlined in detail in Chapter 2, the current appointments process 
for the senior judiciary – particularly the composition of the relevant 
appointing commissions – is, as Lord Justice Etherton identifies, 
“constitutionally inappropriate”.193 The presence of a predominant 
senior judicial influence on these panels, reinforced by the system 
of statutory consultations, has created a situation in which (in both 
appearance and reality) one branch of government is in danger of 
effectively becoming a “self-perpetuating oligarchy”.194 
192 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
193 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
194 R Stevens, ‘Reform in haste and repent at leisure: lolanthe, the Lord High Executioner and 
Brave New World’, Legal Studies, Volume 24, Issue 1-2, pp. 1-34, 2003
:
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To address this pressing issue, the membership of the appointing 
commissions for the senior judiciary should be expanded and 
altered in a manner that reduces the scope for self-perpetuation and 
introduces a greater degree of democratic legitimacy. 
Rather than a system of ad-hoc panels convened as and when a 
vacancy arises, a more permanent senior judiciary JAC should be 
established (in a similar vein to the regional JACs charged with lower 
level judicial appointments).195 This body should be responsible for 
appointments for each of the senior positions identified in Chapter 
2: Supreme Court and Court of Appeal judges, the Lord Chief 
Justice and the Heads of Division. This JAC should be composed of 
9 individuals: 3 senior judicial members, 3 parliamentary members 
and 3 lay members.
The judicial membership
The senior judiciary must retain a significant presence on this 
commission. As such, both the President and Deputy President 
of the Supreme Court should be members to continue to offer 
insight on the role of the highest court. The third judicial member 
for England and Wales contests should be the Lord Chief Justice 
who, as head of the judiciary in the jurisdiction and a liaison with 
the other branches of government, should have a clear role.19 In 
relation to Scottish and Northern Irish Supreme Court contests, the 
third member should be the Lord President of the Court of Session 
and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland respectively.19
In the event that one of these judicial members is disqualified 
(which should include whenever they would be appointing their 
own successor, they are themselves applying for a post or they have 
a declared conflict of interests), the Master of the Rolls should be 
the replacement.198 If two of the judicial members are disqualified 
(or one member and the Master of the Rolls) then an alternative 
member of the senior judiciary (as defined in CRA 200) should be 
selected by the relevant lay chair (see below). 
195 The particular benefits of a permanent body are discussed in the following section on 
addressing the diversity deficit.
19 It is important to stress that these recommendations should be taken as a package. It would, 
for example, be highly undesirable to add to the number of senior judicial members on the 
appointing panel without making the broader move to the significantly larger and diversified 
commission suggested.
19 In the event of a mixed contest the Lord Chief Justice should sit on the panel as the 
representative of the jurisdiction from which most applicants will come. 
198 Unless it is the Lord President of the Court of Session or the Lord Chief Justice of Northern 
Ireland who is disqualified, in which case the replacement should be the Lord Justice Clerk or 
the senior Lord Justice of the NI Court of Appeal respectively. 
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The parliamentary membership
The three parliamentarians on the commission should be drawn 
one from each of the three largest Westminster parties. The 
choice of these members would be at the discretion of the parties 
themselves. However, to ensure an important degree of relevant 
expertise, it could be stipulated that these members should be 
selected from the House of Commons Justice Committee (which 
would have the accountability benefit of a guaranteed direct 
connection to the electorate) or from either that committee or 
the House of Lords Constitution Committee. This could also be 
extended to allow the selection of retired Lord Chancellors still 
sitting as parliamentarians. 
In the context of the constitutional implications of devolution it is 
also important to ensure significant input from both Scotland and 
Northern Ireland for appointments to the UK Supreme Court. As 
such, while the process of consultation with the senior judiciary on 
the merit of every Supreme Court candidate should be removed (as 
discussed below), consultation with the First Minister of Scotland 
(and also of Wales) and an appropriate non-judicial Northern 
Ireland consultee should be retained and given greater emphasis 
as an important aspect of the process. This could be augmented by 
introducing a consultation requirement with the chair of the relevant 
devolved parliamentary committees in both Scotland and Northern 
Ireland (of particular relevance for the appointment of justices with 
the required experience in those jurisdictions). 
The lay membership
One lay member should be drawn from each of the three regional 
JACs. One of these lay members should always chair the panel 
for any given appointment. For Supreme Court appointments that 
relate exclusively to one jurisdiction, the relevant lay member for 
that jurisdiction should chair. In the event of a mixed jurisdiction 
Supreme Court contest, the lay member from the England and 
Wales JAC should chair as the representative of the jurisdiction 
from which most applicants will come. For the other senior judicial 
posts, the chair should be the lay representative of the England and 
Wales JAC.199
199 An objection could conceivably be raised to the involvement of the Scottish and Northern Irish 
lay representatives in the selection of the senior posts carrying specific relevance to England 
and Wales. However, the presence of these members, contributing expertise in the assessment 
of judicial quality while further removed from the posts in question would in fact be a positive. 
The alternative would be to have the lay membership for theses posts drawn exclusively from 
the England and Wales JAC.
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The lay members on the panel should be selected in a transparent 
manner, preferably by a vote among the members of the respective 
regional JACs. Lay members should be rotated on a staggered 
three year basis which can be phased in once the commission is 
up and running (i.e. a member from a different regional JAC will 
be replaced annually after serving a three year term). In relation 
to this lay membership, the important role of relevant academics 
as a bridge between the different ‘camps’ within such a proposed 
panel should be emphasised – although strictly lay, they will carry 
expertise that is relevant to both the judicial and the political aspect 
of the process. 
An appropriately balanced appointing panel200
The key point about a panel balanced in this way is that no single 
section of interests should be able to dominate. The parliamentarians 
provide the much needed connection to the democratic process 
and therefore enhanced legitimacy for the candidate ultimately 
appointed. However, the political input remains very firmly a minority 
one, thus precluding any possibility of an over ‘politicisation’ of 
appointments. The presence of cross-party members (with relevant 
expertise) also reinforces this.
The presence of three senior judicial members on the panel 
preserves the important ability to harness invaluable judicial 
expertise concerning the roles in question. It also enables a greater 
contribution from the Lord Chief Justice who is particularly well 
placed to contribute to the process. However, senior judicial input 
would also be reduced to a clear minority role in the appointment 
of the senior judiciary. As such, this branch of government would 
no longer be open to the charge of unaccountable self-perpetuation 
(with the resulting impact on legitimacy). This would be further 
reinforced by the phasing out of senior judicial consultations for 
Supreme Court appointments (discussed in detail below in relation 
to the significant diversity implications).
Along with individual expertise and broader perspectives, the 
lay membership on the panel provides an important symbolic 
representation of the interests of the general public in how their 
judges are selected. It also serves to further balance and act as 
arbiter between the professional and political interests in judicial 
appointments (as does the lay chairmanship). As an equal partner 
buffering these interests, the lay role in the process would also 
200 The diversity requirement of a gender and ethnicity mix on the panel is discussed in the 
following chapter.
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be enhanced with the freedom from the disproportionate judicial 
influence that exists in the current system. 
Retaining the Lord Chancellor’s veto
One suggestion contained in the Ministry of Justice consultation 
seemingly designed to increase accountability in judicial appointments 
is for the Lord Chancellor to become a contributing member of the 
ad hoc appointing commission for certain senior judicial posts in 
exchange for losing his limited veto power.201 This suggestion is in 
fact flawed – rather than enhancing democratic accountability, it risks 
reducing it at the expense of further judicial influence.
At present, despite the predominating judicial impact on selection, 
the Lord Chancellor holds the power to block (if only once) the name 
put to him as a result of this judge-led process. This is a real and 
meaningful executive power, regardless of apparent concerns over 
the publicity implications of exercising it. Indeed, precisely because 
of these publicity implications, the power retains a significant 
‘message-sending’ capacity that acts as an important latent check 
in the senior judicial appointments process. 
If the Lord Chancellor were to relinquish this veto power, this 
important (and effectively singular) counterpoint to judicial 
influence over the process would be removed. Although he may be 
in a position to then put his views on individual candidates into the 
collective mix, there is no guarantee these will be heeded. Indeed, 
the proposed composition of the resulting ad-hoc panel explicitly 
contains the possibility that such a panel, while including the Lord 
Chancellor, would have a judicial majority. This is before the impact 
on the remainder of the panel of the feeding in of the views of up to 
another 18 senior judges is even felt.
It is very important to remember that we are talking about a 
constitutional system, as distinct from the individuals involved. The 
present Lord Chancellor may feel that he can personally have greater 
sway by contributing his views on the commission. What happens, 
however, if it is a less established or well respected Lord Chancellor 
with a poorer relationship with the senior judiciary? Removing the 
executive end stop opens up the clear possibility of a senior judicial 
appointment being made largely at the unchallenged discretion and 
behest of members of the judiciary. This is both inappropriate and 
undesirable in a mature democracy, not least for the legitimacy and 
long term health of the judicial branch itself. 
201 MOJ consultation paper, ‘Appointments and Diversity: A Judiciary for the 21st Century’, 2011
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The Lord Chancellor should therefore retain the current limited 
veto power and thus the role as “the guardian of the process with a 
long-stop responsibility”.202 This should be in addition to the move 
towards the senior judiciary JAC (with minority parliamentary 
representation) outlined above. In doing so, the process would 
rightly involve all three branches of government in senior judicial 
appointments without affording a disproportionate role to any. This 
reflects the recognition that:
“In a democratic society, the elected legislature, and 
those legislators who serve in the executive under 
the system of responsible government, need to be 
involved in the selection of the judiciary in more than 
a tangential way, if only to protect the judiciary from 
political attack.”203
Post-appointment introductory parliamentary 
hearings
The Canadian experience in recent years has illustrated that 
introductory parliamentary hearings for Supreme Court nominees 
can enhance judicial accountability in the context of increased 
judicial power by providing greater transparency and public 
awareness. Equally importantly, it has shown that - in marked 
contrast to the intrinsically and deliberately politicised process in 
the US – such hearings, if carefully managed, do not necessarily 
undermine judicial independence. 
The distinction lies heavily in the nature and structure of the 
hearing in question. Full pre-appointment parliamentary scrutiny of 
candidates or nominees in which the relevant committee has a veto 
or a formal recommending power is perhaps inevitably politically 
loaded. In Canada, however, much of the sting is drawn precisely 
because the purpose of the hearing is not to alter the actual 
nomination. Rather, it is to enhance the legitimacy of the nominee 
through exposure to elected representatives and by ensuring that 
the Canadian public is informed about those wielding significant 
power in their society (and the process by which they come to do 
so). 
In the context of seeking a constitutionally appropriate balance 
in judicial appointments, the introduction of full pre-appointment 
202 Lord Falconer, evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
203 R Stevens, ‘Reform in haste and repent at leisure: lolanthe, the Lord High Executioner and 
Brave New World’, Legal Studies, Volume 24, Issue 1-2, pp. 1-34, 2003
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confirmation hearings in the UK would – while certainly enhancing 
accountability – carry the risk of overtly politicising the appointments 
process, thus swinging the pendulum back too far to the detriment 
of judicial independence. 
This should not, however, be the end of the matter. Instead, a 
process of post-appointment introductory parliamentary hearings 
should be developed for Supreme Court appointments, mirroring 
the Canadian rationale.204 The hearing should be held before a joint 
sitting of the Justice Committee in the House of Commons and the 
Constitution Committee in the House of Lords, thus providing both 
expertise and elected legitimacy. As in Canada, clear guidelines 
would need to be drafted as to the conduct of the hearings and the 
appropriate limits of judicial speech (including the inability of an 
appointee to answer questions about specific issues on which they 
may be required to adjudicate).205 
The often knee-jerk dismissal of proposals for any form of 
parliamentary hearing in the UK is generally based on variations of 
the same two questions (largely left hanging without any attempt to 
pursue them): ‘what could you legitimately ask?’ (or more bluntly, 
‘what would be the point?’) and ‘how can you possibly restrain 
parliamentarians from asking what they shouldn’t?’. Thus, Lady 
Justice Hallett with regard to the former: “I cannot think of any 
question that they could legitimately ask”20; and Lord Irvine with 
the latter: “there would just be no way in which you could restrain 
politicians in such a process from asking [inappropriate] questions; 
they would not be able to resist the temptation”.20 
Even a cursory examination of the Canadian precedent reveals the 
limitations of these objections. The guidelines on appropriate judicial 
speech have been universally respected by the parliamentarians 
involved and the hearings, while no doubt challenging for the 
nominees, have been carried out with the utmost “civility and 
moderation”.208 Is there really so little faith in their British equivalents 
204 Such a hearing would potentially also be relevant for the position of the Lord Chief Justice given 
the political and administrative significance of this role. A precedent for post-appointment 
hearings in the UK can be found in relation to the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of 
England.
205 These guidelines could build on the existing Liaison Committee guidelines used in the pre-
appointment hearings mandated for other senior public office positions. 
20 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011. See also Goldring (to Constitution 
Committee): “I cannot see what meaningful discussion you can have without asking the 
sorts of questions that immediately would result in independence being attacked, making it 
impossible for a judge to try a particular sort of case.”
20 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
208 Professor Hogg, constitutional adviser to Canadian Supreme Court, in 2011 hearing transcript: 
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/ja-nj/2011/doc_325.html
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to do the same? The evidence from the UCL Constitution Unit review 
of pre-appointment parliamentary hearings for various senior 
public office positions suggests that this is unjustified - “intrusive 
questioning...is unknown: Select Committees have followed the 
Liaison Committee guidelines on proper lines of questioning”.209 
Furthermore, beyond the necessary restrictions, Canadian Supreme 
Court nominees have answered informatively on a broad range of 
topics (as outlined in Chapter 5), from the qualities that qualify them 
for the post to the broad relationship between the judiciary and the 
other branches of state. The result is that the Canadian public are in 
a position to know far more about those exercising public power in 
their society than their equivalents in the UK.
Indeed, there is also a significant irony in the two objections quoted 
above. Both Irvine and Hallett (and others expressing similar views 
throughout the Constitution Committee review) are effectively 
querying the ability of UK parliamentarians to ask pertinent, 
challenging and yet appropriate questions relating to the judicial 
function while simultaneously taking part in a parliamentary 
process that is doing precisely this. It is tempting to say that the 
inability to recognise this stems again from the looming spectre of 
the American ‘bogeyman’ – a very different type of hearing than 
that advocated here. 
The introduction of post-appointment parliamentary hearings 
would serve to increase both accountability and legitimacy – as it 
has in Canada - without posing a threat to judicial independence 
precisely because:
“The purpose of this form of scrutiny . . . is to promote a 
form of dialogue between people’s representatives and 
appointed judges about major legal developments, to 
help the governed understand what is happening and 
why; and to provide an opportunity to the governors 
to explain and justify.”210 
209 Hazell and Malleson written evidence to Constitution Committee
210 Keith Ewing, quoted in A Le Sueur, ‘Developing mechanisms for judicial accountability in the 
UK’, Legal Studies, Volume 24, Issue 1-2, 2004
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7 – Addressing the diversity deficit 
“Merit...directs attention to proven professional 
achievement as a necessary condition, but also 
enables account to be taken of wider considerations, 
including the virtue of gender and ethnic diversity.”211
Lord Bingham
Senior Law Lord, 2009
 
A new statutory ‘merit’ test recognising 
the importance of collective competence in 
appointments to the Supreme Court
As outlined in Chapter 4, the proposed introduction of the s159 
‘tie-break’ provision will do little to address the diversity deficit 
that is now having a “corrosive impact...on the legitimacy of the 
judiciary”212. The key to enhancing diversity lies in a reassessment 
of the prevailing construction of ‘merit’ in senior judicial 
appointments. In relation to the Supreme Court specifically, it lies 
in the recognition that ‘merit’ must relate directly to what that court 
needs as a collective to be competent as a collective. This collective 
competence directly involves diversity in the same way that it 
requires an appropriate range of specialist legal experience.
At present, CRA 2005 simply requires candidates to the Supreme 
Court to be appointed ‘on merit’, without laying out any explanation 
of what this means. Thus, for Lord Bingham, as the opening quote 
shows, the ‘wider considerations’ of gender and diversity were in 
211 T Bingham, ‘The Law Lords: who has served’, in L Blom-Cooper, B Dickson and G Drewry (eds), 
“The Judicial House of Lords 18-2009”, 2009, p. 12.
212 K Malleson, ‘The New Judicial Appointments Commission in England and Wales’ in K Malleson 
and P Russell (eds.), Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from 
around the world, University of Toronto Press, 200
:
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fact components of merit. However, as outlined above, this is now 
far from the prevailing conception. Indeed, there is a real sense in 
which ‘merit’ has been hijacked by a very specific (male orientated) 
understanding of individual ‘excellence’ that has achieved a near 
mythic status. Thus, for Bingham’s successor, Lord Phillips, ‘merit’ 
in relation to Supreme Court appointments does not even strictly 
allow the appointing commission to “have regard to the composition 
of the court and any gaps of specialities on the court.”213
One solution, given the silence of the Act, would be for the Lord 
Chancellor to issue guidance (under section 2(9) CRA 2005) that the 
broader understanding of merit emphasising the collective needs of 
the institution should be applied in Supreme Court appointments. 
However, so entrenched is the ‘top-10’ or ‘league table’ obsession 
identified by Lord Falconer214 that it would be clearer and cleaner to 
put such a reformulation on a statutory footing.
Although somewhat ambivalent on the matter, Lord Phillips 
has suggested215 one such amended statutory test that would, 
with one minor addition for emphasis (identified in italics), serve 
as an appropriate reformulation of ‘merit’ in Supreme Court 
appointments:
The commission must select that candidate who will 
best meet the needs of the court, having regard to 
the judicial qualities required of the Supreme Court 
Justice, the current composition of the court and the 
diverse composition of the society it serves.
Under this, it would be possible to ensure that a court in which 
“public law now occupies about half of the time”21 has sufficient 
public law expertise. It would also be possible to ensure that the 
delivery of justice in society is informed by the broad range of 
experiences and perspectives that contribute to that society. To 
ensure, in short, a collective court that is fit for purpose.
Composition of the appointing commission and the 
phasing out of judicial consultations 
As suggested above, the move towards a permanent senior 
judiciary JAC with a minority parliamentary representation should 
be accompanied by an end to the process of statutory consultations 
213 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
214 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
215 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
21 Lord Phillips, Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
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on Supreme Court appointments with the senior judiciary. As 
identified in Chapter 2, these consultations are problematic from an 
accountability perspective as they increase the potential for judicial 
self-perpetuation. However, they are even more so from a diversity 
standpoint. 
To illustrate this, it is worth focusing on the most recent Supreme 
Court appointments process from 2011 (in which two justices 
were appointed – one sixth of the court’s full composition). The 
five member ad-hoc appointing commission was all male (and all 
white).21 Consultations would then have been undertaken with the 
remaining nine members of the Supreme Court (eight white men, 
one white woman)218; the other defined members of the senior 
judiciary who were not themselves applying for the posts (up to 
eight white men) and the required political figures (three white 
men).219 In total, therefore, the major input as to the merits of each 
and every candidate came from up to 24 white men and one white 
woman. It is worth reiterating here the comment from the Chief 
Justice of the Canadian Supreme Court:
“Psychologists tell us that human beings have a 
tendency to see merit only in those who exhibit the 
same qualities that they possess....So when they 
look for merit, they tend to look for someone like 
themselves.”220
If this was the HR procedure for a post in a private company or 
organisation of any kind, it would be considered untenable. Instead 
it was the most recent appointment process for the body at the apex 
of one branch of government in the UK.221
21 Phillips, Hope, Stephens, Russell and Coghlin
218 The death of Lord Roger led to one of the vacancies.
219 These figures reflect the fact that the Northern Irish consultee is now in practice the Chief 
Justice of Northern Ireland.
220 Beverley McLachlin, ‘Why we need women judges’, International Association of Women 
Judges th Biennial Conference, Sydney, May 2006
221 It is again important to stress that the criticism here is purely of the system and not the 
undoubted high calibre individuals both contributing to and appointed under this system. 
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Individuals potentially providing input into the most recent 
Supreme Court appointments process
Female
Male
BAME
White British
4% 96% 100%
This situation needs to be addressed. First, the proposed senior 
judicial JAC (or indeed any senior judiciary appointing commission) 
should have a clear diversity and ethnicity mix. This would come 
largely from the politicians and lay members on the panel and 
could be driven by legislative provision or guidance from the Lord 
Chancellor.  As outlined above, this is a policy already pursued in 
other jurisdictions with positive records on enhancing diversity.
Secondly, the judicial element of the consultation process should 
be phased out and replaced by a thorough system of appraisal 
(the political consultations retain an important role in relation to 
diversity as discussed above). Indeed, as Lord Powell points out “it 
is a bit absurd” that a system of appraisal relevant to senior judicial 
appointments is not already in place. Furthermore, this would also 
reduce the scope for unresolved conflicts of interest in the process 
of appointments to the Supreme Court (as outlined in Chapter 2). 
It may be that the removal of judicial consultations will lead to the 
loss of some valuable contributions on a particular candidate’s 
quality but this can be compensated for from the appraisal process, 
from having the Lord Chief Justice on the appointing panel and from 
an expanded work product assessment element in the appointment 
procedure.222 With this, the inherent inequalities in the process 
from a diversity perspective (and the corresponding legitimacy 
implications) can be addressed. 
222 The current Supreme Court appointment procedure involves inviting candidates to submit 
three examples of their work product from which their legal abilities can be assessed.
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Continuing to provide only one name to the Lord 
Chancellor
The main lesson on diversity from an international perspective is 
that, in creating a more representative judiciary, political will and 
leadership are key. In keeping with the basic laws of physics, it 
would appear that nothing ‘trickles-up’ without a substantial push. 
 As such, one suggestion that has been made is that the Supreme 
Court appointing commission (and potentially those for other senior 
judicial posts) should provide three names to the Lord Chancellor 
rather than one (with the possibility that the list must contain one 
female or BAME candidate).223 The value of this is that it could use 
the lever of political direction to enhance diversity. 
This mechanism has significant potential advantages (in terms of 
accountability as well as diversity). However, in the contemporary 
constitutional settlement (as outlined in Chapter 1), it is ultimately 
not our preferred option in light of the delicate balance required 
between the three touchstones for judicial appointments.224 A 
central aspect of the expanded judicial role is the protection of 
individual and minority rights through, when necessary and 
legitimate, a robust challenge to executive power. The ability to do 
this is predicated on a significant degree of independence from that 
executive that could be challenged (or be seen to be challenged) by 
a return to executive discretion in senior judicial appointments.
As Lord Falconer puts it:
“The role of the judges in our society has become 
much more important. They defend our rights in a 
much more meaningful way than previously. If you 
look at the way in which politicians have behaved in 
the past 10 years, the Prime Minister and the Home 
Secretary when I was Lord Chancellor sought political 
advantage from attacking the judges. The current 
Prime Minister and the current Home Secretary have 
done precisely the same. The idea that a member of 
the Prime Minister’s Cabinet, who is appointable and 
fireable by the Prime Minister, should be the person 
223 See for example Malleson and Hazell written evidence to the Constitution Committee, Autumn 
2011.
224 It is important to again note that this is the case in the context of the full package of 
proposed measures. If the reformulation of the merit test (along with the political input on 
the appointing commission to drive the application of this test) is not accepted, the diversity 
(and accountability) benefits of greater executive involvement may become a more appealing 
alternative.
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who appoints the people that the Prime Minister and 
Home Secretary are [attacking ]... [is ]unthinkable.”225 
While ‘unthinkable’ is unfair, it is perhaps undesirable. It is 
important again to focus on the system rather than the individual. 
It is unquestioned that the present Lord Chancellor and his recent 
predecessors (all well established figures with significant legal 
expertise and respect within the judiciary) would not allow and 
have not allowed political considerations to enter into senior 
judicial appointments. However, there is no guarantee that future 
incumbents will be similar figures with similar minds or that they 
will even be lawyers (given the weakening link between the legal 
profession and parliament). From a systemic perspective therefore 
it is preferable to utilize alternative forms of political leadership and 
will to drive the diversification of senior judicial appointments. 
A politically driven, long term HR approach to senior 
judicial appointments 
The first aspect of political leadership would be the reformulated 
statutory test for appointments to the Supreme Court. This would 
operate hand in hand with the proposed senior judiciary JAC 
which, with a minority parliamentary membership (and subject to a 
retained executive veto), balances the interests of all three branches 
of government without lending disproportionate sway to any. 
The political members of this commission would be in a position 
to drive the application of the broader understanding of merit, 
emphasising its impact on collective competence and therefore 
its important role as a factor in the appointments process. This 
would perhaps particularly involve an emphasis on the possibility 
of appointing to the highest court members from a wider range of 
career backgrounds (as explicitly mandated by parliament under 
CRA 2005) in line with the approach taken in senior courts in other 
jurisdictions.
This role should be supported by “real, persistent leadership”22 
from the Lord Chancellor as “a more active champion of diversity”.22 
This should involve giving guidance to the political members of the 
panel to perform the function identified and more formal guidance 
(under the statutory provision) to the full commission as deemed 
necessary. Thus, without the complication of executive discretion, 
225 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
22 Lord Falconer, Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
22 Lord Powell, Constitution Committee evidence
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the Lord Chancellor can and should, as the ‘guardian of the process’, 
be responsible for holding the appointing commission to account 
on diversity (a role that could be emphasised by taking up Baroness 
Neuberger’s suggestion that he also chair the Judicial Diversity 
Taskforce228). 
A further area in which the Lord Chancellor could provide useful 
guidance is interconnected with the benefit of moving away from 
ad hoc appointing panels towards a more enduring senior judiciary 
JAC. Under the pre-CRA 2005 system, one of the advantages was the 
potential for the so called ‘tap on the under-represented shoulder’ 
whereby promising non-traditional candidates could be identified 
as part of a long term HR strategy, monitored, and subsequently 
given direct encouragement to apply. 
In direct contrast, a fundamental problem with the current system of 
ad hoc panels for senior appointments is that they are, by definition, 
concerned purely with a snap-shot picture rather than a long term 
view and are characterised by no consistency of membership or 
approach. A significant advantage of establishing a permanent 
senior judiciary JAC (as with the present regional JACs for lower 
courts) is that it could remedy this. With prompting from the Lord 
Chancellor, this body could pursue a more joined up approach to 
enhancing judicial diversity at senior levels by actively engaging in 
outreach activities. This approach mirrors that in jurisdictions with 
positive records on enhancing judicial diversity (notably Canada 
and the US) which “consider active recruitment to be an essential 
aspect of the work of the commission”.229 As such, the benefits 
of the old system could be combined with the advantages of the 
new in the pursuit of an appropriately diverse, independent and 
accountable senior judiciary.230 
228 Evidence before the Constitution Committee, Autumn 2011
229 C Thomas, ‘Judicial diversity in the United Kingdom and other jurisdictions: A review of 
research, policies, and practices’, The Commission for Judicial Appointments, November 
2005
230 A more enduring senior judiciary JAC would also be well placed to monitor and react to 
the longer-term needs of the Supreme Court in relation to the broader issues of succession 
planning. Between the 2009 move across Parliament Square and 2013, the Supreme Court 
will have lost and replaced over half of its membership due to largely mandatory retirement 
of justices at 70. With this age limit set to remain fixed, a the senior judiciary JAC would have 
the advantage of being able to plan ahead and recognise any need to advance individuals into 
the Court of Appeal and Supreme Court at a younger age to prevent disruptions caused by 
excessive turnover.
